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Neotrusteeship or Mistrusteeship?
The "Authority Creep" Dilemma
in United Nations Transitional
Administration
ChristianEric Ford*
Ben A. Oppenheim*

ABSTRACT

State failure poses one of the greatest threats to
international peace and security. The collapse of governing
institutions breeds civil wars, generates refugee flows, causes
enormous civilian suffering, foments instability in neighboring
countries, and provides safe havens for transnationalcriminal
and terrorist organizations. As a result, commentators and
policymakers have increasingly called for a remedy to the
problem of state failure. One of the most compelling arguments
is to draw on an old legal institution: internationaltrusteeship
by the United Nations (U.N.). This Article argues that while
trusteeship may prove effective in managing state failure, it also
carries risks. Internationalinterventions typically take limited
control of the domestic environment of weak countries without
absorbing their sovereignty. Trusteeship, in contrast, vests
enormous authority and discretion in temporary international
administrators,who in turn tend to centralize their power and
decision-making in order to meet challenging mission mandates
under difficult conditions. This "authority creep" absorbs
sovereignty and in the process risks eroding incentives for
leaders of failing states to cooperate with the U.N. Worse,
unmitigated authority creep may weaken the political basis for
successive international administration and reconstruction
efforts. This Article concludes by outlining an alternative
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system of oversight for U.N. transitional administratorsas a
means of preservingpartial sovereign authority and control for
domestic political actors.
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I. INTRODUCTION

State failure poses one of the greatest threats to international
peace and security.' Failed and failing states foment widespread
violence such as civil war and genocide, generate massive refugee
crises, and provide safe harbors for terrorist and international
criminal organizations. Tragically, international responses have been
unable to contain the rising tide of state failure. 2 As the search for
more effective responses to state failure widens, scholars and
policymakers have with increasing vigor endorsed variations of
trusteeship, an old international legal architecture designed to
perform governance and state-building functions when a sovereign
3
state is incapacitated.
Most commentators envision casting the United Nations (U.N.)
in the role of trustee 4-a position that builds on the U.N.'s recent role

1.
The Center for International Development & Conflict Management's 2005
global survey of one hundred sixty-one countries identified thirty-one "at serious risk"
of succumbing to governmental instability as a result of "societal crises" or conflicts.
MONTY G. MARSHALL & TED ROBERT GURR, PEACE AND CONFLICT 2005: A GLOBAL
SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY 34 (2005), available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/publications/papers/peaceand_
conflict_2005.pdf; see also DEP'T FOR INTERNAL DEV., WHY WE NEED TO WORK MORE
EFFECTIVELY IN FRAGILE STATES 7 (2005), available at http://www.dfid.gov.ukl
pubs/files/fragilestates-paper.pdf (identifying forty-six "fragile states of concern" from
the standpoint of the United Kingdom's Department for International Development);
Foreign Policy & The Fund for Peace, Failed States Index, 154 FOREIGN POLY 50, 5054 (2005) (reporting a range of"at risk" and failed states). The Failed States Index was
updated and republished in 2006 and 2007. Apart from concerns over the civil wars
and humanitarian crises fomented by failed and failing states, the 2002 National
Security Strategy of the United States directly links state failure to national security,
arguing that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by
failing ones." NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (2002).
2.
To date, individual states, the U.N. Security Council, the World Bank, and
a broad constellation of regional and non-governmental organizations have deployed a
variety of ad hoc measures, ranging from humanitarian assistance to limited
intervention, in a disjointed and largely ineffective attempt at triage. See James D.
Fearon & David D. Laitin, Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States, 28 INT'L
SECURITY 5, 11 (2004) (discussing the spread since 1988 in peacekeeping and state
reconstruction in countries torn by civil war).
3.
See discussion on U.N. trusteeship infra Part II.
4.
See INT'L COMM'N
ON INTERVENTION
& STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 7 (2001) (arguing that the capacity for common action
manifested by the U.N. in recent years suggests that it is the best choice to fill a
trusteeship role).
See also, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane, Political Authority After
Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL
DILEMMAS 275, 297 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003).
Adherence to unitary notions of sovereignty . . . is likely to hinder innovative
and constructive institutional innovations that could consolidate the short-term
accomplishments of the intervention ... [into] the conditions for self-sustaining
peace and security. . . . Effective solutions . . . require reconceptualizing
sovereignty.... Domestic sovereignty can be strengthened through a strategy
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in the management of war-torn countries. 5 This management-the
transitional administration of sovereign territories 6-offers a critical

that incorporates external authority structures, thus renouncing Westphalian
sovereignty.
Peter Galbraith, The United Nations TransitionalAuthority in East Timor (UNTAET),
97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 210, 211-12 (2003) (drawing on Galbraith's own
experience, as a U.S. Ambassador who negotiated a treaty on behalf of East Timor that
governed oil exploration in the Timor Sea, to offer an implicit endorsement of a highly
centralized U.N. transitional authority if circumstances warrant); Gerald B. Helman &
Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 3 (1993) (considering the
emerging phenomenon of the failed nation-state and setting out approaches to dealing
with such states); Boris Kondoch, The United Nations Administrationof East Timor, 6
J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 245, 252 (2001) ("[T]he idea of bringing back the various forms of
trusteeship has been raised . . . in respect of failed states and self-determination
disputes."); Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, FOREIGN AFF., JulyAug. 2002, at 127, 137.
If ... other methods of stanching failure prove unsuccessful and a weak state
actually fails, earnest efforts at reconstruction are required. . . . [T]he
accomplishments of the UN transitional administrations in Cambodia and East
Timor ...indicate that nation building is possible if there is sufficient political
will ....
Martin Indyk, A U.S.-Led Trusteeship For Palestine, WASH. POST, June 29, 2002, at
A23 (arguing that the U.S. policy of "nationbuilding" should be replaced by the kind of
deep engagement represented by a trusteeship commitment); Michael McFaul, Wrong
Time to "Stay the Course," WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2003, at B7.
What about creating an Organization for International Trusteeships?
Founding countries would offer assistance in governing failed or new states
(Palestine, Liberia, maybe even Iraq) in return for leverage over "sovereign"
decisions in these places-a kind of IMF with guns and a focus on state
building rather than economic reform. As a representative organ of all states,
with a commitment to neutrality and a focus on diplomacy between states, the
United Nations cannot effectively undertake such missions.
Suzanne Nossel, A Trustee for Crippled States, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2003, at A17
(arguing that a revitalization of U.N. trusteeship is necessary to remove the burden
from the U.S., which has assumed a kind of de facto trustee status); Rob Jenkins,
Collateral Benefit, DISSENT (2006), available at www.dissentmagazine.org/
article/?article=426 (noting that it is possible to discern
a silver lining in the abject failure of basic institutions, let alone democracy, to
take root in postwar Iraq ... [namely] enhanced legitimacy in the international
community for what has been called "neotrusteeship," an arrangement whereby
multilateral institutions temporarily govern states that have collapsed in
spasms of misrule and violent conflict.).
See also Paul Kennedy, UN Trusteeship Council Could Finally Find a Role in Postwar
Iraq, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), May 9, 2003, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org
security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0511trusteeshipcouncil.htm
("[Ihf UN member states
don't wish to abolish [the UN Trusteeship Council], why not use it to assist the world
organization in the tricky issue of dealing with collapsed nations?").
5.
See Fearon & Laitin, supra note 2 (noting in footnote 16 five existing or
past U.N. transitional administrations of war-torn countries: UNTAG (Namibia, 1988),
UNTAC (Cambodia, 1992), UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia in Croatia, 1996), UNMIK
(Kosovo in Serbia and Montenegro, 1999), and UNTAET (East Timor, 1999)).
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lens through which to view the potential for and problems of
trusteeship over failed and failing states.
A U.N. transitional administration is distinguishable from other
forms of international intervention by the degree to which it assumes
a state's sovereignty. 7 In contrast, the more common, less robust
types of international interventions leave sovereignty to or share
sovereignty with domestic political leaders. Sovereignty sharing
often leads to consensus-building and collective-action delays that can
frustrate the international authority's attempt to effectively
The
implement governance and reconstruction operations.
minimizes
model
typically
transitional administration or trusteeship
sovereignty sharing with domestic political actors and places
governing authority in the hands of an administrator appointed by
the U.N. Secretary General. 8 This is seen by many as a more rapid
and effective means of shoring up or reconstituting governing
institutions in crumbling states, implementing reconstruction
operations, and disbursing funds.
Notwithstanding the various permutations of trusteeship
proposed in recent scholarship, 9 the general debate over international
governance of sovereign territory has largely focused on the risks of
failing to employ trusteeship, but has neglected to weigh these
against the potential risks inherent to trusteeship itself.10

Six operations to date have featured this level of authority: United Nations
6.
Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG), 1989-1990; United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992-1993; United Nations
Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium
(UNTAES), 1996-1998; United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET), 1999-2002; and the single currently ongoing transitional administration,
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 1999Present. Id.
For a detailed definition and discussion of sovereignty and its relationship
7.
to authority and control, see infra Part III.
The Secretary-General, however, frequently consults informally with
8.
Security Council members as well as states neighboring the "client" state of an
intervention. For a brief discussion, see U.N. General Assembly, Security Council,
93Report of the United Nations Panel on Peace Operations(the "Brahimi Report"),
95, U.N. Doc A/55/305 (Aug. 21, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/
reports/peace-operations/docs/a 55_305.pdf.
See, e.g., Stephen Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for
9.
Collapsed and Failing States, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 2004, at 85, 119 (2004) (offering
several potential architectures for trusteeship, including a role for regional or great
powers in directly governing over failed states).
10.
There are, of course, some important exceptions to this trend. Simon
Chesterman, a particularly lucid commentator on U.N. transitional authorities, has
argued that the "primary barrier" to transitional authority arrangements is not
operational; instead, it is a simple lack of political will. Simon Chesterman, Ownership
in Theory and Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations, 1 J.
INTERVENTION & STATEBUILDING 3, 5 (2007). William Bain, by contrast, has argued

that trusteeship necessarily involves a relationship of asymmetric power and coercion
in which the promotion of human rights through international administration corrodes
those same rights by violating the dignity of self-determination. See generally William

60

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 41..35

This Article argues that Security Council resolutions vesting
governing authority over sovereign territories in U.N. transitional
administrations leave administrators to confront a dilemma.
Administrators are given mandates that almost unavoidably contain
significant ambiguity regarding the extent of their own power and the
degree to which they must substantively share authority with local
political actors. They must then choose between (1) using the
discretion built into their mandates to exclude domestic political
actors from the decisionmaking process in order to avoid the delays
inherent in political consensus-building, or (2) governing by
consensus with local political leaders, which may bolster the
transitional administration's legitimacy, but risks delays or political
entanglement."
This problem is amplified by the limited (and
.sometimes uncertain) period of time available to transitional
administrators to build and oversee local governing capacity and get
reconstruction efforts underway. 12 This dilemma leads to what we
call authority creep. Authority creep refers to the tendency for
transitional administrators to use the discretion built into a mandate
to centralize their authority.
The experiences
of recent transitional administrations
established to govern sovereign territories suggest that the
administrators that are appointed to lead these missions tend to
centralize their authority and are reluctant to share it with domestic
political actors. Authority creep carries significant risks because it is
at odds with state sovereignty. Sovereignty is a complex system of
rights, capacities, and responsibilities emerging from the interplay
between two distinct bundles of power: (1) political authority, which
encompasses domestic and international legal sovereignty and
carries--correctly or not-the implication of legitimacy; and (2)
domestic control, or the ability to enforce compliance within a state's

Bain, In Praise of Folly: InternationalAdministrationand the Corruption of Humanity,
82 INT'L AFF. 525 (2006).
11.
Another difficulty of transitional administration is the tense relationship
between the parallel projects of statebuilding and democratization. This issue has
received a great deal of commentary, but it is worth noting that transitional
administrators may also centralize power to avoid entrenching any one particular
faction in a host country.
12.
See generally Simon Chesterman, Imposed Constitutions, Imposed
Constitutionalism, and Ownership, 37 CONN. L. REV. 947, 947 (2005) (noting that
international actors must be aware of the limited timeframe within which they can
expect resources, or else they face difficulties in "sequencing").
Transitional
administrators recognize that they have a sharply limited timeframe in which to build
local capacity, undertake reconstruction, or implement reforms, since both donor states
and the domestic political actors tend to expect-or at least want-speedy
improvements in governance and security.
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territory. 13 In a failed state, domestic control is often fractured along
multiple axes or diffuse to the point of near-irrelevance. 14 In
contrast, the other half of a state's sovereignty, its political
authority-and in particular international legal sovereignty-is not
15
as dynamic.
Political authority is one of the key sources of legitimate power
for leaders in weak and failing states. 16 It is often the only factor
that distinguishes a warlord from a statesman. The most maligned
dictator nevertheless signs binding legal commitments, receives
diplomatic immunity, and represents the state in commercial
transactions and dealings with external creditors. This source of
authority and power becomes all the more important as a regime's
degree of domestic control becomes more uncertain.
In such circumstances, warring groups seek territorial control
and military dominance as a means to effective legal and political
authority. In submitting to international intervention, actors in
failed states exchange some of their means of domestic control,
particularly control of their military forces, for a role in the
transitional government, which confers upon them some portion of
legal authority.
This Article views the problem of authority creep prospectively
and argues that the tendency towards the deepening of international
control during transitional administrations carries very real risks if
viewed on a long time horizon. First, authority creep leads to
maximal and typically contentious intrusion of a state's sovereignty.
This pattern is thus likely to reduce the probability that the
permanent members of the Security Council, especially those that
adhere to the more traditional view of state sovereignty as
noninterference (such as China and Russia), will approve mandates
17
establishing future international transitional administrations.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, authority creep also
threatens to undercut the expectations of domestic political actors

13.

See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3-4, 9-10

(1999) (noting distinctions between political authority and domestic control). For a
more detailed discussion of authority and control, see infra Part III.C.
See Fearon & Laitin, supra note 2, at 13-14 (explaining that state failure
14.
leads to a loss of domestic control and resultant destabilization).
15.
See id. at 21 (noting that the lack of stable internal legal structures or legal
authority within the failed state leads to "mission creep," in which ordinary
peacekeeping operations cannot withdraw from the area without creating even more
collapse, and a transitional administration becomes necessary).
16.

See

SIMON

CHESTERMAN,

YOU, THE

PEOPLE: THE

UNITED

NATIONS,

TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING 128-45 (2004) (noting that the
collapse of state structures does not leave a total vacuum of power, but rather often
creates conditions that enable non-state actors to assume political authority).
17.
See DOMINIK ZAUM, THE SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX 64 (2007) ("Major nonWestern states such as China, Russia or India . . . have been wary of the UN's 'new
interventionism' since the 1990s.").
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with respect to their sovereignty.18 Sovereignty is the currency that
determines the relationship between the transitional administration
and prominent domestic political actors, since the latter often broker
the peace arrangements that place sovereignty in the hands of an
international authority in the first place. 19 These actors-whether
leaders of factions contending for control of the state, or warlords
operating in the absence of governing institutions-seek authority,
power, and political survival. 20 The fact that these actors were
involved in peace negotiations and treated by the international
community as de facto political representatives reinforces an
expectation that they will be meaningfully involved in the decisionmaking process once the transitional administration begins. It is
unrealistic to assume that these actors no longer want the authority
for which they were previously fighting; it is more reasonable to
assume that they have simply chosen to pursue their interests within
the new political arena created by third party intervention, instead of
relying on their own coercive or political capacity.
This Article argues that the net result of these two effects will be
that the U.N.'s role in achieving peace and stability in war-torn and
failing states through trusteeship will be circumscribed if the problem
21
of authority creep is not remedied, or at least managed.
The argument rests on several basic mechanisms that make
authority creep possible. First, international legal agreements such
as Security Council resolutions often lack precision 2 2 because the
more specific the terms of an agreement become, the more likely it is
23
that the agreement will favor one state's interests over another's.

18.
For an in-depth discussion of sovereignty, see infra Part III.
19.
See William J. Durch, Getting Involved: Political-Military Context, in THE
EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING 16, 20-22 (noting the U.N.'s shift to "brokered"
peace operations that negotiate deals, including the transitional administration of
countries, by involving the actors who have been creating the immediate conflicts).
20.
See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12 (detailing the kinds of actors who have
seized power in failing states and their history in previous transitional administration
missions).
21.
Put simply, the way in which the international community governs
territories today will have a direct impact on subsequent attempts to govern similarly
unstable territories. The persistence of weak, fragile, and failing states-such as Iraq
Somalia, and Democratic Republic of the Congo-strongly suggests that, in the years
ahead, the international community will have to repeatedly confront the question of
whether it should govern war-torn sovereign territories. See Krasner, supra note 9, at
85-119 (discussing at length the problems created by unstable or failing nations, and
the necessity for new strategies to confront them).
22.
For a discussion of precision in international agreements, see Kenneth W.
Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 412-13 (2000) (explaining
that precision "specifies clearly and unambiguously what is expected of a state or other
actor ...in a particular set of circumstances"). Also, for a discussion of the difficulties
of crafting international legal mandates, see infra Part II.
23.
The Security Council might also use mandate ambiguity to help account for
the inherent unpredictability of post-conflict territories. The ambiguity would give a
transitional administration maximum latitude to respond to unforeseen events.
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The very nature of international compromise can necessitate
generalities when the parties involved have competing or conflicting
interests. 24 In the case of Security Council resolutions establishing
transitional administrations, the conflicting interests and beliefs
pivot on significantly different conceptions of state sovereignty. 25 A
Security Council resolution establishing a transitional administration
is thus likely to contain contradictory language that implicitly vests
sovereignty in the international body while reaffirming the
sovereignty of the territory being governed. 26 These competing
pressures create ambiguity regarding the degree to which the
transitional administration is expected to share sovereignty with
domestic political actors. Effectively managing such contingencies
27
requires operational flexibility and creativity.
Clearly, the catastrophic consequences of state failure cannot be
ignored. 28 However, unmitigated authority creep risks straying over
the line separating productive and counterproductive forms of
assistance, and may weaken the political basis for future U.N.
interventions. We believe that the U.N. must play the central role in
any attempt to manage or reverse state failure, and that some form of
trusteeship is likely to emerge as a template for doing so. It is thus

24.
For a general discussion of the need for ambiguity to achieve international
agreement, see HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 299-300 (6th ed.
1985) (arguing that international legal agreements are vague
not by accident . . . but regularly and of necessity. For such documents, in
order to obtain the approval of all subjects of the law, necessary for their
acquiring legal force, must take cognizance of all the divergent national
interests that will or might be affected by the rules to be enacted. In order to
find a common basis on which all those different national interests can meet in
harmony, rules of international law embodied in general treaties must often be
vague and ambiguous, allowing all the signatories to read the recognition of
their own national interests into the legal text agreed upon.).
25.

See, e.g., David M. Malone, US- UN Relations in the UN Security Council in

the Post-Cold War Era, in US HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 73, 75
(Rosemary Foot et al. eds., 2003) (arguing that in the late 1990s, "serious tensions
resurfaced in the Council over issues relating to state sovereignty.").
26.
See, e.g., Virginia Page Fortna, United Nations Transition Assistance
Group, in THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 353, 361 (William J. Durch ed., 1993) (discussing the transitional assistance
mandate for Namibia, which affirmed sovereignty since it "called for elections in the
'whole of Namibia as one political entity"' but used extremely vague language as to the
extent of the U.N. involvement and mission specifics).
27.
See, e.g., Fortna, supra note 26, at 365-71 (noting that the UNTAG in
Namibia had difficulty achieving mission goals because it would not integrate existing
domestic structures with its own administration); see also ZAUM, supra note 17, at 6465 (noting that the U.N. has assumed transitional authority where the affected
territories had extreme internal turmoil and lacked functioning governments).
28.
See Krasner, supra note 9, at 86 (noting that the potential for conflict
spillover as well as the humanitarian implications of state failure make the issue one of
paramount importance, for which the international community must develop coherent
strategies).
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imperative that scholars and policymakers weigh trusteeship's
potential effectiveness in stabilizing and rebuilding failed states
against the political risks propagated by its repeated use. This
weighing is particularly important when the risks stand to threaten
the U.N.'s political legitimacy and leverage over the long term. The
critical variation among future transitional administrations will
involve the degree to which Security Council mandates dictate the
terms of the relationship between the transitional administration and
domestic political leaders.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II traces the genealogy of
U.N. trusteeship. It reviews the legal architecture establishing U.N.
management of post-colonial territories and traces the development of
U.N. peacekeeping from early cross-border monitoring and
stabilization missions to far more complex governance and
reconstruction operations. It finally assesses the challenges inherent
to crafting mandates for transitional administration missions that
violate, to a greater or lesser extent, the sovereignty of host countries.
Part III illustrates sovereignty's fundamental connection with
the success of transitional administration by reviewing and analyzing
traditional understandings of the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty
embodies several distinguishable powers, rights, and responsibilities
that can be divided into two broad dimensions: authority and control.
The interplay of these dimensions influences the international
response to state failure as well as the strategic calculus of leaders in
weak and failing states that face international intervention.
Part IV surveys two recent instances of U.N. transitional
administration.
The cases demonstrate how authority creep runs
against the domestic political leaders' pre-intervention expectations
29
regarding sovereignty-sharing, which in turn leads to friction.
Part V briefly summarizes the critical tensions inherent in U.N.
transitional administration.
It concludes by offering a policy
recommendation that addresses the challenges outlined in the
Article. Principally, the Article recommends that the U.N. create an
adjudicative body to oversee transitional administrations as a means
of breaking out of the authority creep dilemma.
An official
adjudicative body would provide a carefully balanced approach to
intervention that preserves the U.N.'s operational efficacy and
flexibility as well as its political credibility with key actors in weak
and failing states, thus potentially strengthening trusteeship as a
sustainable tool for managing state failure.

29.
It is worth noting that, typically, a Security Council resolution establishing
a transitional administration reflects some of the domestic political leaders'
expectations since the resolutions often incorporate the terms of a peace settlement
brokered with those leaders.
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II. THE GENEALOGY OF U.N. TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY: FROM
TRUSTEESHIP TO PEACEKEEPING, AND BACK AGAIN

The U.N.'s recent deployment of
flows from its long history in temporary
to complex peacekeeping operations. In
trusteeship followed in the footsteps

transitional administrations
governance, from trusteeship
its original formulation, U.N.
of the League of Nations'

mandate system 30 and provided for the international governance of a
select group of former colonial territories. 31 The composition of this
group reflected geopolitical realities at the close of World War II,
including former League of Nations mandates, colonial territories
"detached from" the former Axis powers, and territories voluntarily
32
Trust
committed to U.N. oversight by their colonial rulers.
territories were overseen by the Trusteeship Council, a principal
organ of the newly-formed U.N. system, which in turn delegated
functional administration of the trusts to specific U.N. member
states. Trusteeship under the flag of the U.N. was designed to
provide temporary governance while building local capacity for self33
government.
The principle of sovereignty remained a core concern in the
design of the trusteeship system. Article 78 of the U.N. Charter
expressly limited the scope of trusteeship to non-member states,
noting that relations among members "shall be based on respect for
the principle of sovereign equality." 34 For its part, the Trusteeship
Council guided the trust territories towards either independence or
mergers with other states; the bulk of the trusts achieved self-

The League's Mandate system was designed to provide governance for
30.
territories deemed unready for self-rule. Article 22 of the Charter of the League of
Nations framed trusteeship essentially as a matter of capacity-building, noting the
necessity for the "advanced nations" to provide guidance and instruction in governance
to Mandate territories. See League of Nations Covenant art. 22. See also Francis B.
Sayre, Legal Problems Arising From the United Nations Trusteeship System, 42 AM. J.
INT'L L. 263, 264 (1948). Sayre draws a brief but illuminating comparison between the
U.N.trusteeship and the League of Nations mandate system. Id. at 265-97.
Id. at 263-97 (detailing the trusteeship system and its various provisions
31.
for troubled states).
ZAUM, supra note 17, at 54-55 (noting that the Cold War era international
32.
administrations "were established to ease transition from colonial rule to selfgovernance" and "were all deployed with the consent of the affected states, or the states
that controlled the territory").
33.
U.N. Charter art. 73.
U.N. Charter art. 78.
34.
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governance by the early 1960s. 35 The Council suspended its activities
in 1994, with the independence of Palau, the last trust territory. 36
Despite the U.N.'s early experience with the governance of the
trust territories, the deployment of transitional administrations is
simply the most recent step in the evolution of U.N. peacekeeping
operations. The Charter contains no provisions for peacekeeping,
though such operations are arguably the U.N.'s most effective and
publicized contribution towards world peace. 3 7 As Paul Kennedy has
commented, "in 1945, [peacekeeping] meant keeping the peace among
nations and checking those that threatened their neighbors or
countries further afield. ''38 The U.N. was largely designed as a
mechanism to ensure collective security through good offices,
consensual mediation and adjudication of disputes, and-most
importantly-collective war-making under the authority of the
Security Council as a means of last resort. 39 However, these
mechanisms of collective security were rendered inoperable by the
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union 40 because
the symmetrical veto powers of the two members prevented the
Security Council from taking a meaningful role in managing
conflict. 41
Nevertheless, the U.N.'s neutrality and legitimacy
provided an opening for it to undertake "more modest, but under the
circumstances, more realistic objectives: the mediation of... conflicts,
the monitoring of cease-fire agreements, and the separation of hostile
'4 2
armed forces.
Throughout the Cold War, such undertakings took two forms:
unarmed observer missions and peacekeeping operations. 43 Observer

35.
United Nations, Dept. of Public Information, Trusteeship Council,
http://www.un.org/documents/tc.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) ("The aims of the
Trusteeship System have been fulfilled to such an extent that all Trust Territories
have attained self-government or independence, either as separate States or by joining
neighbouring independent countries.").
36.
Id.
37.
Fearon & Laitin, supra note 2, at 15 (noting that the U.N. Charter does not
specifically mention peacekeeping).
38.
PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 78 (2006).

39.
See William J. Durch, THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note
19, at 1-3 (discussing the U.N.'s created purpose of establishing "global collective
security," and the ways in which the U.N's structure has enabled it to carry out that
purpose).
40.
Id. at 1.
41.
The sole Cold War exception is the Korean "police action," which was
managed under the flag of the U.N. in the midst of a Soviet withdrawal from the
Security Council. For a brief description, see Paul Diehl, PeacekeepingOperations and
the Quest for Peace, 103 INT'L STUD. Q., 485, 486 (1988).

42.
43.

Id.
See Michael Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, InternationalPeacebuilding."A

Theoretical and QuantitativeAnalysis, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 779, 781 (2000) (detailing

the various kinds of peacebuilding missions).
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missions consisted of relatively small-scale bodies that were tasked
with monitoring compliance with truces, 44 while peacekeeping
operations represented more significant efforts to support the
cessation of conflict through the insertion of lightly-armed
international forces between warring parties. 45 Peacekeepers were
charged with separating belligerent forces, monitoring their activities
to ensure compliance with ceasefires and truces, and providing the
46
transparency and stability necessary for effective negotiations.
Both observer missions and conventional peacekeeping operations
were, as a rule, undertaken with the consent of the warring parties,
the latter typically under the Chapter VI authority of the Security
Council. 4 7 Although the U.N.'s more ambitious collective security
mechanisms failed to function throughout the Cold War, the number
48
of peacekeeping operations grew steadily.
As the Cold War came to a close, the U.N. found itself
unshackled and faced with the remnants of decades of superpower
patronage and war-by-proxy in the developing world. 49 At the
request of the Security Council, Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali drafted a report, the 1992 Agenda for Peace, that sketched a
substantially expanded role for the U.N. in managing both
international and sub-state conflict. 50 The Security Council, in turn,
began to consider "threats to international peace and security" in
much more expansive terms than ever before; this new conception
would allow the U.N. to intervene to an unprecedented degree in
internal conflicts it considered a threat to peace and security at
51
large.
The result of this expansive interpretation was a second
generation of peacekeeping operations aimed at resolving civil

44.
See id.
45.
See Diehl, supra note 41, at 486-87 (detailing various kinds of
peacekeeping missions).
46.
Id. at 487; see also Doyle & Sambanis, supra note 43, at 779-91 (comparing
and contrasting various kinds of peacebuilding operations along several variables).
47.
See ZAUM, supra note 17, at 55 (noting that Cold War era international
administrations "were all deployed with the consent of the affected states, or the states
that controlled the territory").
48.
See Michael Lipson, A "Garbage Can" Model of UN Peacekeeping, 13
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 79, 79 (2007) (noting that after the Cold War ended,
peacekeeping missions grew exponentially in terms of number of missions authorized
by the Security Council, and also in terms of resources devoted to such missions).
49.
See Sayre, supra note 30, at 263-64 (discussing the problems for the
international community that stemmed from the collapse of colonialism and
imperialism).
50.
The Secretary-General, An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping,delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/47/277S/24111 (June 17, 1992).
51.
See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 2-3 (detailing the "growth in activism"
and "new interventionism" that characterized Security Council policy through the
1990s).
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conflicts.
This form of intervention, often described as
"multidimensional peacekeeping," 52 involved a far broader menu of
activities and was designed to support near-term peace and effective
political settlements, as well as to reconstruct nations damaged by
civil conflict. 53 Throughout the 1990s, multidimensional operations
extended the U.N.'s reach far beyond the separation of forces to
politically and operationally complex issues such as the
demobilization and social reintegration of soldiers, the reform of
police and military organizations, the management and oversight of
54
elections, and economic reconstruction.
Multidimensional
peacekeeping
forms
the
conceptual,
operational, and political basis for U.N. transitional administration.
However, transitional administration stretches beyond even the most
complex and expansive peacekeeping arrangements, as it is rooted in
a grant of governance authority by a resolution of the Security
Council.5 5 Administrators act as the custodians of governmental
authority during the period of transition, whereas peacekeeping
operations assist at most with specific (if still critical) aspects of
domestic governance, and so infringe more weakly on de facto
56
sovereignty, but not on dejure sovereignty.
Transitional
administrations
are
"the most pervasive
contemporary form of building institutions of governance . . . [and]
have the most comprehensive mandates and authority over local
institutions at their disposal. '57 As a practical matter, this expansive
writ of power mirrors the complexity and challenge of governing,
pacifying, and rebuilding war-torn societies.
Multidimensional
peacekeeping operations tend to take place in very challenging
environments, often politically complex war-to-peace transitions,
while transitional administrations operate in even more fragmentary

52.
Doyle & Sambanis, supra note 43, at 791.
53.
See id. at 786-91 (defining multidimensional peacekeeping as well as
comparing it to other forms of peacebuilding).
54.
Id.; see also Lipson, supra note 48, at 88-89 (detailing the significant
amount of emphasis and resources devoted to the U.N. peacekeeping missions).
55.
ZAUM, supra note 17, at 61 ("[Tlhe UN Security Council can assert
authority over a territory under Chapter VII and delegate this authority to a
transitional administration," which "has been understood to include the right to
assume the governance of a specific territory under Article 41 of the Charter.").
56.
See Durch, supra note 23, at 21 (making the comparative claim between the
remedies of transitional administration and peacekeeping using UNTAC as an
example:
[A] 1989 initiative by the five permanent members of the Security Council,
brokered through the Paris Conference on Cambodia, led to authorization of a
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia . . . designed to rebuild the country
and oversee its transition to democratic rule.
Such settlements allow
peacekeeping operations to be more than temporary palliatives.).
57.

ZAUM, supra note 17, at 2-3.
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and divisive political, military, and economic conditions. As Michael
Doyle notes, "the worse conditions are, the more Chapter VII
troops, and extensive the
authority, large and well-equipped
58
be."
must
authority
transitional
A. Security Council Mandates and TransitionalAdministration
The defining feature of transitional administration-the factor
separating it from other forms of complex peace operations-is the
delegation of governance responsibilities and authority to a
transitional administration.5 9 This authority flows from a binding
Security Council resolution, which contains the mandate for the
transitional administration and articulates the scope of powers and
60
responsibilities vested in the transitional administrator.
However, Security Council resolutions have generally failed to
articulate that scope with precision, via mandates that clearly
delineate the extent (and limitations) of the transitional
Instead, mandates underpinning
administrator's authority. 6 1
transitional administrations typically describe a broad and complex
cluster of mission objectives, featuring ambiguous rules and a wide
scope for reasonable interpretation. 62 As such, Security Council
mandates establishing transitional administrations typically provide
what H.L.A. Hart referred to as secondary rather than primary
rules.6 3 Whereas primary rules directly require entities "to do or
abstain from certain actions," secondary rules "do not impose clear
obligations, but instead 'confer powers' to create, extinguish, modify,
64
and apply primary rules."
The distinction is important in the transitional administrative
context for two reasons. First, efforts to secure a transitional
authority must negotiate the complex political terrain of the Security
Council deliberations and secure an effective consensus amongst its
members. As in other areas of international politics, such consensus
is facilitated by ambiguity-the more precise the terms of an

58.

Michael Doyle, The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace, 13 GLOBAL

GOVERNANCE 1 (Oct.-Dec. 2007).

59.
See ZAUM, supra note 17 ("[I]nternational administrations present the most
pervasive contemporary form of building institutions of governance. . . . [I]nternational
administrations have . . . comprehensive authority over local institutions at their
disposal.").
60.
Id. at 61 (noting that the Security Council can pass resolutions that
empower other institutions to wield the Security Council's power over the specified
territory).
See Abbott et al., supra note 22, at 409-15 (discussing the various methods
61.
of achieving precision that international documents have used, and the rationale
behind this drive to make precise agreements).
For more on precision, see id. at 412-13.
62.
Id. at 403 (quoting H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (1961)).
63.
Id.
64.
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international agreement, the more difficult it -is to reach a
65
consensus.
Second, and more significantly, efforts to craft a clear, effective
mandate are frustrated by the inability of actors to specify ex ante the
terms, conditions, and scope of powers necessary for the transitional
administration to fulfill the mandate.
Complex peacekeeping
operations and transitional administrations operate in extremely
challenging and unstable political territory and require significant
flexibility to manage inevitable unforeseen contingencies. 6 6 Yet as
David Kreps has noted,
[W]hen we speak of adaptation to unforeseen contingencies . . . we
cannot specify ex ante how those contingencies will be met. We can at
best give some sort of principle or rule that has wide . . . applicability
67
and that is simple enough to be interpreted by all concerned.

This problem inexorably drives Security Council resolutions towards
imprecision and results in grants of maximum discretion to U.N.
agents on the ground.
The grant of broad authority to carry out what is otherwise an
ambiguous mandate gives a transitional administrator tremendous
discretion to either share power with domestic political actors or
retain authority.
Each strategy has its own distinctive set of
incentives. Administrators have a strong operational and normative
interest in retaining legitimacy in the eyes of domestic elites, former
warring parties, and the population at large, and may do so by
sharing decision-making authority broadly. 68 Yet authority-sharing
risks embroiling the transitional administration in political struggles
between domestic elites, which may slow or block the building of
effective, democratic governing institutions as groups compete for
power and influence.
Thus, administrators also have a strong
incentive to centralize authority, particularly within the relatively
brief duration of most missions. As later portions of the Article
argue, this tendency effectively invades the sovereignty of sub-state
actors and warring parties, who may see the advantages from
accommodation with the U.N. eroded by the expansive authority of
the transitional administration.

65.
See MORGENTHAU, supra note 24, at 299-300 (describing the difficulty of
reaching consensus where extremely precise terms have been established).
66.
See Doyle & Sambanis, supra note 43, at 781 (arguing that the volatile
situation, warring factions, and civil unrest present in failed states require significant
flexibility on the part of the international administrators).
67.
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES
ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 93 (James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle, eds., 1990).
68.
See Doyle & Sambanis, supra note 43, at 781 (noting that trusteeship
efforts must "overcome deep distrust and powerful incentives to defect from the
peace.... [C]onscious direction by an impartial agent to guarantee the functions of
effective sovereignty becomes necessary.").
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III. SOVEREIGNTY AS STRATEGIC CURRENCY

Understanding how sovereignty acts as a currency is imperative
to grasping the strategic decision-making of the domestic political
actors of a territory placed under international administration.
Sovereignty is a critical variable in transitional administrations
relative to other forms of peacekeeping because the very essence of
sovereignty, a state's autonomy from external intrusion into domestic
affairs, is willingly and directly violated. 69 This scenario is played out
to a lesser degree in other peacekeeping operations, which may
involve similar delegation of sovereignty de facto, though not to the
same degree. A transitional administration, unlike other 70forms of
peacekeeping, assumes both de jure and de facto sovereignty.
The concept of sovereignty has been revisited and reconceptualized by international relations, political science, and legal
71
scholars with each paradigmatic shift of the international system.
Sovereignty has been at the forefront of recent debates over the

69.
See id. at 779 ("[T]he responsibility for postconflict peacebuilding" leads
states "to undertake extensive intrusions into the domestic affairs of legally sovereign
states.").
70.
For an excellent analysis of this dynamic, see RICHARD CAPLAN,
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF WAR-TORN TERRITORIES: RULE AND RECONSTRUCTION
It should be noted, however, that Caplan's definition of transitional
(2006).
administration is broader than other common definitions and encompasses operations
otherwise categorized as complex peacekeeping missions. Cf. Fearon & Laitin, supra
note 2 (noting in footnote 16 that Bosnia and Afghanistan also feature a highly
centralized authority but distinguishing these operations from five existing or past
U.N. transitional administrations: UNTAG (Namibia, 1988), UNTAC (Cambodia,
1992), UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia in Croatia, 1996), UNMIK (Kosovo in Serbia and
Montenegro, 1999), and UNTAET (East Timor, 1999)).
"Paradigm shifts" refers to events such as post-colonialism, the end of the
71.
Cold War, and the era of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. For a survey of
recent international legal literature, see, for example, Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks,
Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2003)
("[D]ebates about how states should orient themselves to the international order
dominate international legal scholarship. These debates typically presuppose a tension
between the normative aspirations of state sovereignty and binding international
obligation."); see also Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L.
259, 259 (2004) ("Sovereignty has become an essentially contested concept.... The
contemporary dispute over sovereignty is unavoidably a dispute over the future of the
political."); Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2030 (2003)
(noting that it "is well accepted that, since the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo,
international law has reconfigured sovereignty."); Ian Ward, The End of Sovereignty
and the New Humanism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2091 (2003) (declaring sovereignty debates
themselves a thing of the past). For recent articles by political scientists focusing on
sovereignty, see, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty,
Shared Sovereignty, and InternationalLaw, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1075 (2004) (analyzing
sovereignty as a concept that has no stable definition except as it is revealed by the
behavior of states); Robert A. Mundell, Monetary Unions and the Problem of
Sovereignty, 579 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. SC. 123 (2002) (discussing
monetary sovereignty in the context of policy sovereignty and legal sovereignty).
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establishment of the International Criminal Court, 72 the war in
75
74
Iraq, 73 developments in international trade, and human rights.
Intuition suggests that there should be a commonly accepted
definition of a concept that is so important to the international
system and legal institutions. Despite, or perhaps because of, its
importance, a clear definition of sovereignty remains elusive and
76
widely debated.
Although a clear and consistent definition of sovereignty has not
emerged, there is a popular, almost reflexive, understanding of the
concept based on the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which concluded
the Thirty Years' War and has long been considered the foundation of
the modern international system. 77 The lasting outcome of the
Treaty was a legal assertion that European monarchs exercised
"supreme power" within a defined territory. 78 "The disintegration of
the Holy Roman Empire and the emergence of the independent
kingdoms of England, France, and Scotland . . . destroyed the
conception of the one and indivisible Christian order of the Middle

72.
See, e.g., Douglas E. Edlin, The Anxiety of Sovereignty: Britain, the United
States and the International Criminal Court, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2006)
(arguing that the United States and Britain's disagreement over the role and scope of
the International Criminal Court can be accounted for by looking at their respective
perceptions of sovereignty); Symposium, Justice & Sovereignty: Implications of the
International Criminal Court, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 3 (2003) (debating at
length issues of sovereignty in light of the International Criminal Court).
73.
See, e.g., Symposium, War, International Law, and Sovereignty:
Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New Century, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 379 (2005)
(debating the war on terror's implications for sovereignty).
74.
See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006) (documenting changes in sovereignty

resulting from the creation of the WTO).
75.
See, e.g., GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (John Bell & James Crawford eds.,

2004) (pointing out the discord between the international system's recognition of
sovereign equality among states and its increasing support of holding states
responsible for the preservation of human rights); Francis M. Deng, Divided Nations:
The Paradox of National Protection, 603 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. Sci. 217
(2006) (evaluating the challenges raised by displaced people, who under traditional
notions of sovereignty would remain within the jurisdiction of the very states now
neglecting and persecuting them).
76.
See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 71, at 1751-53 (comparing two
accepted definitions of sovereignty (realist or constructivist) against a proposed "new
model," which argues that "states are organizational entities embedded in a wider
social environment"); Krasner, supra note 9, at 85 (defining sovereignty as "recognition
of juridically independent territorial entities and nonintervention in the internal
affairs of other states").
77.
For a summary of the International Relations literature attributing the
formation of the modern state system to the Treaty of Westphalia, see Andreas
Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT'L
ORG. 251 (2001). Osiander questions these scholars and counters that the Treaty in
fact "is silent on the issue of sovereignty." Id. at 266.
78.
MORGENTHAU, supranote 24, at 328.
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Ages. '79 In addition to becoming the supreme authority within a
territory, the monarch was also "precluded" from exercising authority
within the territory of another monarch. 80 The Treaty of Westphalia,
it is often argued, marked the codification of nonintervention doctrine
and bound the supreme leader's authority or jurisdiction to
territory. 8 '
Westphalia also defined the primary political unit
comprising the international system: the nation-state.8 2 Sovereignty
is thus seen as the "hard shell" surrounding each state that thereby
83
creates a territorially and juridically independent fortification.
Sovereignty gives each state its property of "impenetrability. '8 4 This
85
is the popular understanding of modern state sovereignty.
This widely accepted definition of sovereignty has been
challenged recently, catalyzing debates over a more precise and
contemporary meaning. These debates often center on two issues.
The first issue concerns the fundamental sphere of rights and powers
encompassed by modern conceptions of sovereignty. In particular,
does sovereignty signify self-determination that is intertwined with
the responsibility that states protect the human rights of their
citizens, or does it signify territorial and political inviolability that
shields a state from external interference?
The answer is
fundamentally political and it fluctuates as norms and the
distribution of power within the international system change. The
international community is thus left to struggle with a now-familiar
dilemma: how do states advance international norms when doing so
violates the sovereignty of another state? Legal scholars tend to
assess this trade-off by weighing the degree to which one or the other

79.

GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY 85 (2d ed. 1951).
80.
MORGENTHAU, supra note 24, at 328.
81.
See, e.g., SEYOM BROWN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING
GLOBAL SYSTEM: TOWARD A THEORY OF THE WORLD POLITY 69 (1992) ("Even to this day

two principles of interstate relations codified in 1648 constitute the normative core of
international law: (1) the government of each country is unequivocally sovereign within
its territorial jurisdiction, and (2) countries shall not interfere in each other's domestic
affairs.").
82.
Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 20
(1948) (stating that to the Peace of Westphalia "is traditionally attributed the
importance and dignity of being the first of several attempts to establish something
resembling world unity on the basis of states exercising untrammeled sovereignty over
certain territories and subordinated to no earthly authority"); see also Krasner, supra
note 9, at 87-88 (dating the rise of traditional sovereignty to the Treaty of Westphalia's
language).
83.
John H. Herz, Rise and Demise of the TerritorialState, 9 WORLD POL. 473,
474 (1957).
84.
Id.
85.
See, e.g., Krasner, supra note 9, at 85 ("Although frequently violated in
practice, the fundamental rules of conventional sovereignty-recognition of juridically
independent territorial entities and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other
states-have rarely been challenged in principle.").
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violates international law.8 6 The underlying logic is simple: the cost
to the international system correlates with the magnitude of
noncompliance with international law. The analysis usually ends
there.
The second issue in the debate focuses on whether sovereignty is
fundamentally changing and, if so, to what extent. How the evolving
trade-off between competing notions of sovereignty affects the
strategic decision-making of states is often not considered. For
instance, each occurrence of the trade-off-whether in the form of
humanitarian intervention or non-consensual peace enforcementhas an effect on the future strategic calculus of weak and failing state
leaders, who are themselves vulnerable to intervention by stronger
states. The conduct of weak and failing states' leaders can invite
intervention by either stronger states or the U.N.8 7 Whether the
international community intervenes is based in no small part on its
If sovereignty under the
prevailing notion of sovereignty.8 8
Westphalian tradition signifies non-interference, stronger states may
be less inclined to intervene in the affairs of weaker states, since such
intervention would violate a foundational principle of the
However, if sovereignty is understood to
international system.
encompass issues of human rights, stronger states may consider
themselves obligated to intervene in the affairs of other states. Thus,
the perceived legal and political trade-offs of enforcing human rights
at the expense of the traditional, Westphalian non-intervention model
are based in large part on prevailing understandings regarding
modern state sovereignty.
With these issues and questions in mind, this Part lays out four
agendas. First, it explores the question of whether sovereignty is
indeed changing, paying particular attention to literature on

86.
See, e.g., Bain, supra note 10, at 527-28 (noting that the redefinition of
sovereignty as "responsibility" occurs without sufficient calculation of the possible evils
arising from international administration, thus the possible importance of the
traditional idea of sovereignty). Cf. Krasner, supra note 9, at 85 (arguing that the
rules of traditional sovereignty "no longer work, and their inadequacies have had
deleterious consequences for the strong as well as the weak. . . . [B]etter domestic
governance in badly governed, failed, and occupied polities will require the
transcendence of accepted rules." Krasner believes this decision calculus is justified
because international conceptions of human rights demand intervention on behalf of
the people facing abuses including genocide at the hands of the leaders of their failing
states.).
87.
See Krasner, supra note 9, at 86 (listing considerations from security to
humanitarianism as reasons why powerful states or institutions see the need to
intervene in the affairs of failing states).
88.
Id. at 87-88 (noting that the traditional or "WestphalianNatellian" concept
of sovereignty prevents strong nations from intervening before the crisis point for the
failing states, and only when such ideas of sovereignty are demolished can frequent,
effective intervention take place); Bain, supra note 10, at 527 (arguing that redefining
"sovereignty" as "responsibility" is the necessary pre-requisite to the "America neoconservative" "unabashed exercise of power for the sake of good").
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international relations and political science. It uses as a baseline the
Westphalian understanding of sovereignty that is rooted in notions of
territorial inviolability and scrutinizes the ways in which sovereign
authority interacts with evolving international norms regarding
Second, this Part explores the
protection and human rights.
definition and usages of sovereignty more familiar to the legal
community. Third, this Part proceeds to disaggregate sovereignty
into observable rights, privileges, and immunities, relying heavily on
89
Stephen Krasner's richly descriptive work on sovereignty.
Krasner's contribution to the literature allows us to analyze these
privileges and immunities in terms of two distinct aspects of
sovereignty--control and authority-and to analyze how these
interact. 90 Finally, this Part moves the sovereignty literature from
description to explanation by presenting a theory of how the gains or
losses of the rights, privileges, and immunities in each respective
bundle interact with each other and ultimately affect the strategic
calculus of political leaders. Special attention is paid to the question
of how gains or losses within these sovereignty bundles influence the
strategic decision-making of both the U.N. and failing-state leaders
during the negotiation and implementation of a U.N. peacemaking
mission.
A. What (if Anything) About Sovereignty Has Changed?International
Relations & PoliticalScience Conceptions of Sovereignty
The question of whether sovereignty is changing has drawn the
attention not only of international relations and international law
scholars, but also of the U.N. itself. In "A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility," the U.N. Secretary-General's High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change suggests that the new
responsibility of states to respond to threats to international peace
and security would require "a quite radical rethinking of
sovereignty." 91 The report "asserts that all signatories of the UN
Charter accept a responsibility both to protect their own ... [flailure
to fulfill these responsibilities can legitimately subject them to
sanction. '9 2 The report declares that U.N. membership can no longer
be used to validate

89.
See generally KRASNER, supra note 13, at 9-10 (describing a distinction
between authority and control, and explaining four different meanings of sovereignty).
90.
"Interact" refers to how the gain or loss of one power within one of the
bundles-for instance, treaty signing authority-affects the relative importance of
powers associated with the other bundle, and vice versa.
91.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand
Themes of UNReform, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 619, 620 (2005).
92.
Id.
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sovereign status [nor as] a shield against unwanted meddling in a
state's domestic jurisdiction. It is rather the right and capacity to
participate in the United Nations itself, working in concert with other
nations to sit in judgment of and take action against threats to human
93
security whenever and wherever they arise.

In essence, this perspective on changing sovereignty suggests that the
changes are deliberate and made by states themselves in order to
align with the higher expectations of changing human rights norms.
Others have posited that sovereignty has been diminishing over
time, and that this change is occurring in spite of states. 94 The
exigencies of the international system act on states, forcing them to
change the properties of sovereignty. 95 Some international legal
scholars have even claimed that "traditional conceptions of
sovereignty are under assault.196 In the follow-up to his now famous
"The Clash of Civilizations?," Samuel Huntington writes that states
are
suffering losses in sovereignty. . . . [I]nternational institutions have
assumed important functions previously performed by states ....
State
governments have in considerable measure lost the ability to control
the flow of money in and out of their country and are having increasing
difficulty controlling the flow of ideas, technology, goods, and people.
State borders have, in short, become increasingly permeable. All these
developments have led many to see the gradual end of the hard,
"billiard ball" state, which purportedly has been the norm since the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 9 '

Some political scientists have taken this rationale a step further,
asserting that states have very different capacities of control, and
that "despite the legal fiction of sovereignty, states are not all
equal.198 Keohane even warns that "[h]olding onto a classic unitary
conception of sovereignty in a post-intervention situation seems likely
to create unresolvable dilemmas." 99 These treatments or uses of
sovereignty often focus on variables of control and dependency. 10 0

93.
Id.
94.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 284 (2004) (stating that since the 1990's, sovereign
goals have been increasingly "undermined by international political and economic
interdependence").
95.
See id. at 285 (proposing that effective modern sovereignty necessarily
demands that a state delegate some of its inherent power to other states so that they
may intervene in internal affairs).
96.
Id. at 283.
97.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER 35 (1996).
98.
Keohane, supra note 4, at 277.
99.
Id. at 280.
100.
See id. at 281 (suggesting that a nation in endemic conflict is entirely
powerless without the aid of an external authority structure that empowers conflicting
groups to self-govern).
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B. What About Sovereignty Has Not Changed? (Legal Conceptions)
A critical component of state sovereignty, in addition to a state's
ability to control flows and activities, has always been the legal
equality of states. This principle has been consistent and unchanging
for centuries and can be credited with holding the international
system together during that time. 10 1
This expression of the principle of sovereignty and equality of
states exists independently of capacity and control. One of the most
dramatic examples of this occurred after the Allies defeated the Axis
Powers in World War II. Despite the overwhelming asymmetry
between the two sides in terms of military and coercive capacity,
these countries nonetheless conducted the formalities of signing peace
treaties to legally formalize the surrender of the Axis Powers.10 2 The
Allies were victorious and yet recognized their former adversaries as
sovereign equals, worthy of entering into a formal legal agreement
recognized only by equal players. This element of sovereignty has
remained unchanged for hundreds of years.
The legal equality-of-states principle provides all states with
what could be described as a bundle of rights and privileges that do
not vary according to a state's level of sovereign control.10 3 As long as
there is some identifiable representative of a state, that

101.
Sixteenth century Italian city-states provide an excellent example of the
role that sovereign equality has played in ordering the international legal system.
Before the Treaty of Westphalia and the birth of the modern territorial state, Italian
city-states were faced with a problem: with undefined political boundaries, it was
difficult for territorial entities to determine whose subjects belonged to whom. See Ian
Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in InternationalPolitics, 53 INT'L ORG. 379, 398-99
(1999) (stating that the Treaty of Westphalia caused the larger states of the treaty to
respect as legitimate the borders of the smaller states). City-state relations were
bound to disintegrate if this determination was based on measures of control and
capacity. See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: InternationalLaw and the
Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 149, 163 (stating that the Treaty of
Westphalia was motivated by the common desire of the parties to minimize further
"brutal and bloody" conflicts). However, the rising international trade system provided
an answer: political representatives for the purposes of inter-state relations were those
who signed treaties. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE EQUALITY OF STATES: A STUDY IN
THE HISTORY OF LAW 63-64 (AMS Press 1970) (1923) (chronicling how the dominium
Venetiorum came to be empowered with the authority to bind Venice to international
treaties).
102.
E.g., Paris Peace with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, 41 U.N.T.S. 21 (formal
surrender of Bulgaria); Paris Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, 41 U.N.T.S. 135
(formal surrender of Hungary); Paris Peace with Romania, Feb. 10, 1947, 42 U.N.T.S.
31 (formal surrender of Romania).
103.
See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-61 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("[f]n entering the Family of Nations a State comes as an
equal to equals; it demands a certain consideration to be paid to its dignity, the
retention of its independence, of its territorial and its personal supremacy.").
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representative will have a seat at the U.N. 10 4 This state will be able
to sign treaties with other states, and will be afforded powers,
05
protections, and authorities vested in every other sovereign state.'
And these powers and protections are in no way scaled to reflect a
weaker state's lack of domestic sovereignty, control, or capacity.
These dynamics were never more apparent than when the U.N.
responded to the Congolese military attacks on refugee camps in
1997.106
The military massacred hundreds of thousands of
refugees.' 0 7 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights ordered
an investigation, and the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Congo
concluded that Congo's army had committed genocide.' 0 8 The very
government that committed these atrocities against its own people
responded by requesting that the U.N. remove the Special
Rapporteur. 0 9 The U.N. obliged the Congo regime and agreed to
allow Congolese officials to "escort" U.N. personnel while they were
investigating massacre sights." 0 The U.N. also agreed to limit the
investigation team to certain areas and not to investigate "crimes
committed after Kabila took power." 1 The U.N.'s deference toward
Congo's regime-presumably motivated by concerns over preserving
Congo's sovereignty-illustrates
a dark side of traditional
sovereignty.
C. Disaggregatingthe Concept of Sovereignty
The above section highlights conventional definitions of
sovereignty and existing controversies surrounding changes in how
sovereignty is perceived.
This Part explores Krasner's more
sophisticated analysis of the concept. Krasner identifies four "usages"
or "meanings" of the term sovereignty: domestic sovereignty,
interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and
Westphalian sovereignty." 2 Domestic sovereignty refers "to the
organization of public authority within a state and to the level of
'1 3
exercised by those holding territory.'
control
effective
Interdependence sovereignty refers "to the ability of public

104.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 ("The Organization is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.").
105.
See id. art. 9, para. I ("The General Assembly shall consist of all the
Members of the United Nations.").
106.
Kisangani N. F. Emizet, The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN
Peacekeeping Failureand InternationalLaw, 38 J. MOD. AFR.STUD. 163, 169 (2000).
107.
See id. at 163 (citing reports that more than 200,000 refugees were
executed in the Congo between October 1996 and September 1997).
108.
Id. at 169-70.
109.
Id. at 170.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
KRASNER, supra note 13, at 9-10.
113.
Id. at 9.
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authorities to control transborder movements," while international
legal sovereignty refers "to the mutual recognition of states or other
entities. ' 114 Finally, Westphalian sovereignty refers "to the exclusion
of external actors from domestic authority configurations."'1 15 The
Westphalian version reflects the more common use of the term, which
is predicated on the territorial exclusion and independence principles
discussed above.
These four meanings of sovereignty can be distinguished from
one another on the basis of their relationship to authority and control.
For example, "Westphalian sovereignty and international legal
sovereignty exclusively refer to issues of authority," or "a mutually
recognized right for an actor to engage in specific kinds of
activities. ' 116 Any of the following indicators can inform whether
authority exists: recognition by other states as the holder of a state's
sovereignty, juridical equality among states, the provision of
diplomatic immunity, the authority to promulgate and effectuate
domestic law, the authority to sign binding international agreements
with other states, and the recognition by external creditors as the
holder of the authority to enter into financial arrangements on behalf
of a sovereign state. 117 These rights and powers are also reflected in
the principle of sovereign equality of states codified in Articles 2.1
and 78 of the U.N. Charter. 118 The sovereign equality of states
ensures that the leaders of the weakest and most powerful states
possess equal political authority.
In an international system
dominated by power, this principle is one of the few guarantors of
equality. In contrast with Westphalian sovereignty and international
sovereignty, which are primarily concerned with issues of authority,
interdependence sovereignty and domestic sovereignty refer to a
state's control over issues that "flow" over its borders and "what
happens within" those borders. 119 Control is closely correlated with
120
capacity.
While authority and control are often "coterminous" and
mutually reinforcing, what differentiates them is that "control can be
achieved simply through the use of brute force with no mutual
recognition of authority at all. '12 1 Dividing the concept of sovereignty

114.
115.

Id.
Id.

116.
117.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 14-15.

118.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1; U.N. Charter art. 78.
119.
KRASNER, supra note 13, at 10-11; cf. id. at 13 (stating that domestic
sovereignty may refer to both authority or control).
120.
See id. at 12-13 (positing that a state lacks sovereignty--due to a lack of
control under interdependence sovereignty-when it lacks the capacity "to regulate the
flow of goods, persons, pollutants, diseases, and ideas" across its borders).
121.
Id. at 10 (asserting that 'loss of control over a period of time could lead to a
loss of authority . . . [and] effective exercise of control, or the acceptance of a rule for
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into these two categories helps to illustrate how the rights, powers,
and privileges associated with both categories interact with and
reinforce each other. Some of these rights and responsibilities remain
122
constant between states while others constantly change.
Understanding how the two types interact helps to explain the
strategic decision-making of failing state leaders and U.N.
administrators during a peacekeeping operation, especially one led by
an international transitional or interim authority.
D. Moving One Step Further:Strategic Decision-makingas a Function
of PoliticalAuthority and Domestic Control
The ways in which widely accepted conceptions of sovereignty
shape the strategic decision-making of strong states is fairly well
understood.
But how does the understanding of sovereignty
advanced above explain the strategic decision-making of states facing
intervention? If a U.N. peace operation in some way reconfigures a
failing state's sovereignty, it stands to reason that the decision of a
failing-state leader whether to accede to a U.N. mission may be a
function of sovereignty's dual axes. A leader's decision is a function of
the degree to which he thinks the U.N. mission will infringe or modify
his or her authority and control. For example, some leaders have
argued that sovereignty would have to be diminished before the state
"would permit the imposition of trusteeship.' 1 23 If a U.N. operation
infringes on a state's sovereignty, thus altering or diminishing a state
leader's power, how does the state leader weigh the diminution of his
sovereignty against other options, such as continuing to fight a civil
war rather than inviting the U.N. to intervene?
When a state, particularly a failing state, is recognized as
sovereign, unique prerogatives are granted to the apparent rulers of
that state, regardless of their level of domestic control. 124 Political
authority, or what Krasner calls international legal sovereignty, is
especially important to weak or failing states because it gives them

purely instrumental reasons, could generate new systems of authority."). Krasner's
definition of control is somewhat vague but seems to connote the sovereign's ability to
influence the behavior of others in accordance with the sovereign's own ends. A.F.K.
ORGANSKI, WORLD POLITICS 428 (1958).
122.
See ORGANSKI, supra note 121, at 428.
The effective exercise of control, or the acceptance of a rule for purely
instrumental reasons, could generate new systems of authority. If a practice
works, individual might come to regard it as normatively binding, not just
instrumentally efficacious; conversely, if a mutually accepted rule fails to
control behavior, its authority might be rejected over time.
123.
Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 301, 315 (1995).
124.
William Reno, Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire, 1 AFR. STUD. Q.,
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/vl/3/4.htm.
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"standing, influence, and support."125 Such authority is especially
important for weak or failing states lacking control because it grants
them "negative rights of nonintervention" and "positive rights or at
least demands of external support" from international institutions
such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. 126 The
legal equality portion of sovereignty is "a ticket of general admission
to the international arena" 127 that does not vary with a state's
capacity and control.
Moving beyond a sweeping conception of sovereignty to
distinguish between powers of authority and control helps to
illustrate how the international legal system shapes the decisionmaking of leaders active in weak or failing states. By definition, the
government of a failing state has lost the capacity necessary to
Those with
implement policies and enforce rules effectively. 128
authority usually have weak or sporadic control over the
population. 129 As a consequence, the political body must search for
and rely on alternative sources beyond coercion and control to
legitimate its political leadership role; it must look for other sources
130
that legitimate its authority.
Zaire provides an example of how the ticket to admission
becomes more valuable as a state's control and capacity wane. Under
Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko, control and capacity did not
exist "except to insure Mobutu's personal security and to keep
ambitious political rivals ... from eclipsing [him];" Mobuto's domestic
sovereignty was minimal.' 3 ' Under these circumstances of minimal
domestic control,
[g]lobal recognition of the sovereignty of the Zairian state was central
to Mobutu's political strategy . . . as this allowed him to attract
diplomatic support and foreign aid. . . . [U]nquestioned formal
sovereignty also served the useful purpose of simplifying deals with

125.
ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES:
RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD 114 (1990).

SOVEREIGNTY,

INTERNATIONAL

See id. at 112 (discussing this dynamic in the context of "Third World" or
126.
"have not" states).
127.
MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF

SOVEREIGNTY 12 (1995).
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 50 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that in the
128.
context of a monarchy, the sovereign monarch fails when the subjects no longer
habitually obey him).
129.
Cf. id. at 52-53 (hypothesizing that a supremely successful monarchy on an
unflappable "habit of obedience" by the subjects).
See id. at 54-55 (suggesting that the rule of law, whereby rights and titles
130.
are established, is needed to ensure the stability of power in the monarch to his
successor).

131.
Jean-Germain Gros, Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New
World Order:Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti, 17 THIRD WORLD Q. 455,
459 (1996).
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some foreign firms and creditors-another key component of Mobutu's
132
politics.

In short, sovereignty bestowed important prerogatives on Mobutu to
which he otherwise would not have had access due to his lack of
133
control-based Westphalian or domestic sovereignty.
The ongoing political crisis in Somalia illustrates how warring
13 4
groups both covet and leverage international legal sovereignty.
Despite several major shifts in political power in Somalia and no
Somali government since 1991, the U.N. Security Council has
repeatedly recognized "the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
and Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) as the internationally
recognized authorities to restore peace, stability and governance to
Somalia."'135 The world's major powers continued to receive and
accept the credentials of Somali ambassadors. 136 In addition, major
powers such as China continued to enter into official international
agreements with the TFG. 137 The reason for this is simple: the
stability of the international state system depends on the integrity of
its primary units.
In healthy governing systems, control and authority are
mutually reinforcing, but in failed states, the types of temporary
governance structures being proposed may actually create
detrimental trade-offs between the two forms of sovereignty.

IV.REVITALIZING TRUSTEESHIP: TWO RECENT CASES

Peacekeeping
operations have
traditionally focused on
interposing international forces between belligerents in order to
monitor ceasefires and provide assurance of compliance with the

132.
Reno, supra note 124.
133.
Id.
134.
See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Expresses Support
for Somalia's Transitional Government, Parliament; Says Prepared to Consider
Exemption to 1992 Arms Embargo, U.N. Doc. SC/8773 (July 13, 2006), available at
http://www.un.orgNews[Press/docs/2006/sc8773.doc.htm
(reaffirming the Security
Council's commitment to restoring governance and peace to Somalia).
135.
Id.
136.
See, e.g., Chinese President Accepts Credentials from New Ambassadors,
PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE (China), Dec. 29, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200512/29/
eng20051229_231459.html (Somalia's Transitional Federal Government reporting that
Chinese President Hu Jintao accepted the credentials of Somali ambassador Mohamed
Ahmed Awil).
137.
See, e.g., China Provides Six Million US Dollars Economic Aid to Somalia,
PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE (China), Dec. 27, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200512/27/
eng20051227_230947.html ("Chinese Ambassador to Kenya Guo Chongli, on behalf of
the Chinese government in Jowhar, Somalia on Monday signed several agreements
with Somali President Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, providing over 6 million US dollars
economic aid to Somalia.").
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ceasefire or peace agreements, 138 while purposefully minimizing
intrusions upon domestic sovereignty. This form of intervention
However, as the
typically applies to interstate conflicts. 139
fragile
an
institutionally
states
in
postcolonial era has left many
restore
to
not
enough
often
are
interventions
condition, traditional
peace and security.' 4 0 Moreover, the massive rise in intrastate
conflict has necessitated more complex peace operations that pierce
"the shell of national autonomy by bringing international
involvement to areas long thought to be the exclusive domain of
domestic jurisdiction."'14 1 So-called multidimensional operations
following intrastate conflict often necessitate activities that extend
well beyond the certification of the peace. 142 Such arrangements can
include the management of elections, post-conflict reconstruction,
143
and-most importantly for this Article--civil administration.
Failing and failed states typically present the international
community with the daunting and costly task of recreating and
rebuilding institutional infrastructure in order to restore peace and
144
security.
Under most circumstances, it is extremely difficult to secure the
necessary political and financial commitments among donor states to
support such large-scale peacebuilding operations. 145 In addition,
traditional peacekeeping missions are not designed to recreate and
rebuild governing institutions. 146 The weak mandates of these
missions lead to undue delays as donor states and domestic political
4
leaders laboriously build a consensus around policy decisions.'

Michael W. Doyle, War and Peace in Cambodia, in CIVIL WARS,
138.
INSECURITY, AND INTERVENTION 181, 190 (Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder eds.,
1999).

139.
See id. at 190, 194 (citing the use of such techniques after the signing of the
peace treaty between Vietnam and Cambodia in 1991).
See id. at 181 (noting that peace "was very fragile" despite the removal of
140.
all colonial forces and the election of a Cambodian government in 1993, two years after
the end of the Cambodian Civil War).
Id. at 205-06.
141.
142.
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 207.
143.
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 4, at 43,
144.
§ 5.24.
145.
See id. at 43 (acknowledging that the biggest hurdle to intervention in
failed states is the cost due to the long period of intervention needed to restore civil
society).
See id. at 45 (recognizing the tendency of international peacekeepers to
146.
have a more hands-on approach resembling "neo-colonial imperialism" rather than
"doing themselves out of a job" by delegating responsibilities to facilitate "patterns of
cooperation between antagonistic groups").
See id. at 70 ("There were too many occasions during the [1990's] when the
147.
Security Council, faced with conscience-shocking situations, failed to respond as it
should have with timely authorization and support.").
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Many see transitional administration, which we argue may
"creep" into de facto trusteeship, as a more viable alternative. Some
have argued that the few peacebuilding operations that have been
successful have featured "a governing international administrative
body that was granted tremendous authority.'1 48 Unlike other
peacekeeping missions, transitional administrations possess "full
executive, as opposed to supervisory, authority"'14 9 and are thus better
able to confront the operational challenges of state failure. These
assumptions are behind the renewed interest in U.N. trusteeship or
some variant thereof as a remedy for failed states.
There are also costs when transitional administrations exercise
this centralized authority to its fullest. On one hand, this structure is
better equipped to avoid interference or obstruction by domestic
political actors and thus fulfill the U.N. mandate in a shorter
period. 150 On the other hand, excluding domestic political actors from
decision-making during transitional governance often leads to greater
anti-U.N. sentiment. 1 1 The following cases illustrate how those costs
manifest themselves. Based on these illustrations, this Article makes
a prospective argument: the dynamics observed during recent
transitional authority missions undercut U.N. credibility with local
political actors and may deter future leaders in failing states from
consenting to U.N. intervention and governance.
A. United Nations Interim AdministrationMission in Kosovo
(UNMIK)
On June 10, 1999, NATO concluded its aerial bombing
operations over Kosovo. 152 The same day, the U.N. Security Council
passed Resolution 1244, which frames the international community's
response to postwar Kosovo. 15 3 Resolution 1244 authorizes the
deployment of U.N. civil and security assets in order to support an
interim administration for Kosovo. 154 It also requests that the
Secretary-General appoint a Special Representative to head the U.N.
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 155

148.

Cf.

RICHARD

CAPLAN,

A

NEW

TRUSTEESHIP?:

THE

INTERNATIONAL

ADMINISTRATION OF WAR-TORN TERRITORIES 39 (2002) (highlighting the shortcomings
of administrative bodies in Bosnia that had less than full administrative authority).
149.
Id. at 10.
150.
See id. at 33 (linking the limited administrative authority by peacekeepers
to delays from local authorities which prioritize partisan gains over general welfare).
151.
See id. (highlighting the competition between UN authorities and local
parallel structures during the first six months of intervention in Kosovo).
152.

INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT 99 (2000).

153.
154.
155.

Id.
S.C. Res. 1244,
Id. 10.

6-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
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The scope of authority granted to the Special Representative by
Resolution 1244 is both sweeping and ambiguous. 156 Resolution 1244
places
the
Special
Representative
in
charge
of:
"Promoting... substantial
autonomy
and self-government
in
Kosovo[,] ...[p]erforming basic civilian administrative functions where
and as long as required[,] ...overseeing the development of provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government," and
ultimately "overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's
provisional institutions to institutions established under political
settlement." 157 It is not clear whether Resolution 1244 provides "for
restoration of full sovereignty in Serbia" or whether the Security
Council Members contemplated that Serbia would retain sovereignty
158
during UNMIK's administration.
Resolution 1244 also contains wording that appears to restrict
the Special Representative's authority. It explicitly reaffirms "the
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" as well as "the call in
previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful selfadministration for Kosovo."' 59 It also tasks the Secretary-General
with establishing "an interim administration for Kosovo under which
the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." 16 0 These two mandates appear to be
in conflict, which is one reason to conclude that the Resolution places
substantial limits on the interim administration's authority since one
action by the administration that is consistent with one of the
16 1
mandates would quite possibly violate the other.

156.
U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative to Kosovo, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, confessed that interpreting the U.N. mission was a challenge. Carlotta Gall,
Crisis in the Balkans: Peacekeeping; Ensnared in Logistics, U.N. Lags in Asserting
Control,N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999.
157.
Id. 11.
158.
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Final Status for Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 10
(2005).
159.
S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 154, at 2.
160.
Id. 10.
161.

Compare

DANIEL

SVEN

SMYREK,

INTERNATIONALLY

ADMINISTERED

TERRITORIES-INTERNATIONAL PROTECTORATES? 198 (2006) ("Consequently, UNMIK's
scope of activity is restricted. If UNMIK exceeds its competencies it will automatically
violate either the sovereignty of the FRY or the democratic rights of the Kosovars."),
with SIMON

CHESTERMAN,

INT'L PEACE ACAD.,

JUSTICE UNDER INTERNATIONAL

ADMINISTRATION: Kosovo, EAST TIMOR AND AFGHANISTAN 4 (2002), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2002/O902justice.pdf (stating that
The central contradiction of the United Nations Interim Admission Mission in
Kosovo's (UNMIK) mandate was that it lacked a political resolution for the
problem of Kosovo. On the ground, it was swiftly recognized that returning
Kosovo to direct control under Belgrade was inconceivable. Nevertheless, the
authorizing resolutions and official statements emphasized continuing respect
for the territorial integrity and political independence of the FRY. In itself,
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When UNMIK arrived in Kosovo, it faced "a scene of chaos,
economic ruin, extensive destruction, lawlessness, widespread
' 16 2
retribution and, in many parts, largely empty of its population.
Progress toward achieving the Security Council's mandate in the first
year of international interim administration was mixed. Murder
16 3
rates, especially among minority groups, were unacceptably high.
Security in the province was deteriorating while "understanding and
tolerance in Kosovo remain[ed] scarce and reconciliation ... far from
164
a reality" between the previously warring ethnic groups.
Infrastructure remained poor, and some critical public goods were in
short supply.
165
UNMIK initially enjoyed a high level of "internal legitimacy."'
However, UNMIK quickly faced strong criticism for its inability to
provide basic governmental services only a few months after its
' 167
inception. 166 UNMIK's legitimacy was gradually being "eroded.
UNMIK's chief, Bernard Kouchner, publicly complained of the
inadequacy of donor state financial support needed for a variety of
168
key services.
UNMIK responded to its challenges and challengers by
exercising "more extensive authority than any previous UN
mission," 169 opting for a decision-making and implementation process

this contradiction presented a serious barrier to the re-establishment of the
rule of law in Kosovo ....
).
But cf. Andreas Zimmermann & Carsten Stahn, Yugoslav Territory, United Nations
Trusteeship or Sovereign State? Reflections on the Current and Future Legal Status of
Kosovo, 70 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 423, 442 (2001) (arguing that UNMIK was granted
sweeping authority beyond previous peacekeeping operations managed by an
international body).
162.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,
2, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/538 (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter Secretary-GeneralKosovo
Report].
163.
See id. 122 ("Kosovo Serbs and other minority communities continue to be
murdered, attacked and threatened. UNMIK staff members have also been murdered
by extremists motivated by ethnic hatred.").
164.
Id.
123, 133.
165.
Perritt, supra note 158, at 10-11.
166.
Steven Erlanger, Chaos and Intolerance Prevailingin Kosovo Despite U.N.'s
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1999, at Al (quoting the editor chief of an Albanian
newspaper who lamented that Kosovo did not "have the basics of a state-no justice, no
security, no electricity, no water and no identity documents" despite the presence of
over 40,000 U.N. and NATO personnel).
167.
Perritt, supra note 158, at 10-11; see also Erlanger, supra note 166
(quoting a young Albanian worker who lamented: "people still view [the U.N.] as
saviors. But if they don't produce soon, they will spend all the glory [of NATO's
victory]. People want civic structures here and a normal life").
168.
Erlanger, supra note 166.
169.
INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON KOSOVO, supra note 152, at 114; see also Ralph
Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial
Administration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 583 (2001) ("The United Nations is currently
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that was less likely to be bogged down by consensus-building with
local political leaders, and an extremely broad interpretation of its
own powers.' 70 UNMIK's chief and his staff "wield[ed] . . . authority
at their discretion, appoint[ed] and dismiss[ed] Albanian officers,
determine[ed] which laws [were] to be applied and which [were] not,
[and] overr[ode], [when] they fe[lt] compelled to do so, the decisions
taken by the elected bodies of the future.''
UNMIK's highly centralized approach did speed policy
implementation; as a result, UNMIK was able to rapidly usher in
macroeconomic improvements with the help of the European Union
Within a year of UNMIK's arrival,
and international donors.
vibrant" as nearly three-quarters
"remarkably
was
economy
Kosovo's
and surpassed pre-war
"restarted"
had
enterprises
private
Kosovo's
of
(1998) production and employment levels. 172 In addition, "winter
wheat planting was at 80 per cent of the historical average; and the
construction sector [was] booming."'1 73 Around the same time, the
Special Representative and head of UNMIK began to exercise
extraordinary powers that arguably exceeded his mandate as set
forth in Resolution 1244.174 Kosovo's economic turnaround in 1999
coincided with several unusually bold administrative decisions made
by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Bernard
Kouchner. 175 The Special Representative, under the auspices of
UNMIK, passed a regulation legalizing "the use of foreign currencies
for payments and contracts in Kosovo," which local laws had
previously forbidden. 176 UNMIK also "assumed the administration of
all property, including monies and bank accounts, registered in the
name of FRY or the Republic of Serbia, that [were] deposited
in... Kosovo."' 177 These acts arguably violated the Security Council's

engaged in one of its most ambitious roles ever: the administration of two territoriesKosovo and East Timor.").
See id. at 10 (noting that UNMIK was interpreted, although perhaps
170.
erroneously, to grant authority to "change political and economic institutions and alter
property regimes").
171.

INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON KoSOvO, supra note 152, at 114.

Secretary-GeneralKosovo Report, supra note 162, 129.
172.
Id.
173.
See Perritt, supra note 158, at 10 ("Ultimate UNMIK authority was clear,
174.
although debate ensued over UNMIK's authority to change political and economic
institutions and alter property regimes because of a mistaken application of the
doctrine of belligerent occupation instead of a more flexible political-trustee concept.").
SMYREK, supra note 161, at 198.
175.
U.N. Interim Admin. Mission in Kosovo, On the Currency Permitted to be
176.
Used in Kosovo, § 1, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/4 (Sept. 2, 1999); see also SMYREK,
supra note 161, at 198-99 (discussing this regulation and whether UNMIK exceeded its
mandated in passing it).
SMYREK, supra note 161, at 201.
177.
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mandate set forth in Resolution 1244 since they "established a new
economic system" within a sovereign state's economic system. 178
However,
despite
some
economic
and
infrastructural
improvements, UNMIK's approach created resentment among
Kosovo's leaders, 179 and the Independent International Commission
on Kosovo in 2000 noted that UNMIK's working relationship with
local officials was hampered by its over-centralization of power and
lack of real consultation with domestic political leaders.1 80
UNMIK responded in December 1999 by creating the Joint
Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS), which was designed to
"[provide] the framework for sharing responsibilities for provisional
administration with representatives of a broad cross-section of
Kosovar society." 181 JIAS consisted of multiple "administrative units
responsible for the management and delivery of public goods ....,,182
Each administrative department comprising the units was "codirected by a Kosovar and a senior UNMIK international staff
member.., with the Kosovars being drawn from the principal ethnic
groups and political parties.' 1 83 This "dual desk system" was guided
by two objectives: to facilitate the training of locals by international
administrators, 8 4 and to share administrative power.' 8 5 This powersharing arrangement proved to be illusory, 8 6 as UNMIK maintained
substantive control over policymaking and implementation.
In response to pressures on the ground, UNMIK proceeded to
enact a series of policy decisions rooted in an extremely generous
interpretation of its status as an interim governing body. A notable
example of this broad interpretation took place in July of 2003,
United Nations officials, acting on behalf of Kosovo and the Minister
for Economy of Albania, signed a bilateral trade agreement that
liberalized

178.
See id. at 202; see also S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 154, at 2 (explicitly
reaffirming "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and "the call in previous resolutions for
substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo ....
").
179.
See INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, supra note 152, at 115 ("Provisional
mayors resented being subordinated to foreigners. As late as October 1999, UNMIK
had only one U.N. official in each municipality. Where UN officials took a cautious and
consultative approach, cooperation gradually emerged; where they behaved more
assertively, confrontation tended to be the result.").
180.
See id. at 114, 115 ("[]t is almost impossible to implement policy and
sustain legitimacy without cooperation with, and indeed reliance on, local experts and
persons of influence ... .
181.

Id. at 114.

182.
183.

CAPLAN, supra note 70, at 99.
Id.

184.

Id.

185.
186.

Id. at 100.
Chesterman, infra note 192, and accompanying text.
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50 per cent of goods traded between them, while seeking to expand the
amount to 90 per cent over the next six years. Only few industrial and
some agricultural goods ... remain[ed] protected under the Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) signed by the head of the UN Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Michael Steiner, and Minister Arben
Malaj. The FTA . . . is the first free trade agreement that has been
187
signed for Kosovo.

In addition, Special Representative Steiner "promulgated . . .the
Criminal Code, which clarifies and modernizes definitions of offences
and incorporates UNMIK regulations and international legal
conventions .. .[and] also signed the new Criminal Procedure Code,
which strengthens the powers of prosecutors and enhances protection
188
of victims and defendants.
In sum, UNMIK read its powers broadly on a range of fronts,
effectively granting to itself international legal sovereignty (including
the right to sign binding treaties with other states), as well as
domestic control, which encompassed lawmaking, economic policy,
and the reconfiguration of property rights.
UNMIK's
activism
generated significant friction as domestic political leaders became
increasingly disenchanted with the transitional authority.189
Although some friction certainly developed from policy failures, much
was rooted in UNMIK's limited grant of domestic control to Kosovar
leaders. 190 To be sure, several successive administrative councils
were designed to "provide [the transitional administration] with
advice, [to act as] a sounding board for proposed decisions and help to
elicit support for those decisions among all major political groups."19 1
However, as Simon Chesterman has noted, "no one was under the
192
illusion that these bodies wielded any actual power."'
Why did UNMIK subordinate domestic political leaders? In part,
UNMIK administrators were "[f]rustrated with the slow pace of
work" of the domestic political bodies. 193 UNMIK reacted by forging
ahead with civil administrative policies and its institution-building

187.
Top UN Official Signs Free Trade Agreement Between Kosovo and Albania,
UN News Centre, July 7, 2003, http:/www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
7651&Cr=kosovo&Crl=. By signing a treaty, UNMIK was essentially exercising a
power traditionally limited to sovereign states.
188.
Id.
189.
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, TWO TO TANGO: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEW Kosovo
SRSG, at i (2003), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=
1618&1=1 (see recommendation 7).
190.
See generally CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 132-36 (observing that the
UNMIK governed Kosovo, "while structures were established through which Kosovar
representatives could 'advise' it").
191.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,
20, delivered to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/1999/779 (July 12, 1999).
192.
Chesterman, supra note 8,at 14.
193.
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 189, at 7.
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agenda. 194 When Kosovar leaders attempted to exercise their own
initiative, UNMIK "reacted angrily" and argued that its mission could
ill-afford delays. 19 5 The end result meant that Kosovar leaders "felt
marginalised from the decision making process."'196
As such, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) "published a damning report in UNMIK's record" that
cited UNMIK for its lack of "democratic principles[,] . . .rule of law,"
and respect for international human rights norms. 197 The report
concluded that Kosovo's people were "therefore deprived of protection
of their basic rights and freedoms."'198
B. United Nations TransitionalAdministrationin East Timor
(UNTAET), 1999-2002
1.

Events Leading Up to the Creation of UNTAET

East Timor's road to recognition as a sovereign nation-state was
paved by years of U.N. stewardship. 199 A former colony of Portugal,
East Timor declared its independence in 1975, only to be invaded and
occupied by Indonesia less than two weeks later. 200 For the next
twenty-five years, East Timor was embroiled in a guerrilla war with
an eye toward independence. 20 1 Over 200,000 persons lost their lives
202
due to war and instability during this period.
In 1999, Indonesia sat at the bargaining table and proposed
"limited autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia. '20 3 Indonesia, in
concert with Portugal, agreed to entrust the U.N. Secretary-General
"with organizing and conducting a 'popular consultation' in order to
ascertain whether the East Timorese people accepted or rejected a
special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of
Indonesia. ''20 4 The U.N. Security Council followed by establishing the

194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 14; Chesterman, supra note 8, at 11.

198.

OMBUDSPERSON INST. IN Kosovo, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 2001-2002, at 3

(2002), available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/E6020710a.pdf
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007); see also Chesterman, supra note 8, at 11.
199.
See Anthony L. Smith, East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation,
15 J. DEMOCRACY 145 (2004) (describing East Timor's path towards independence).

200.
201.

Id.
Naazneen H. Barma, Brokered Democracy-Building:Developing Democracy

through Transitional Governance in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, 8 INT'L J.

MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES, 127, 146 (2006).
202.
Jarat Chopra, The UN's Kingdom of East Timor, 42 SURVIVAL 27, 28
(2000).
203.
U.N. Mission of Support in East Timor, Background, http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/background.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
204.
Id. Portugal was involved in the negotiations since it still had a legal claim
to East Timor. See Smith, supra note 191, at 148 ("(Portugal] had remained East
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U.N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). 20 5 UNAMET's Security
Council mandate included organizing and conducting "a popular
consultation ... on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in
order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept [or
reject] . . . special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary
Republic of Indonesia. '20 6 UNAMET succeeded in registering over
20 7
half of East Timor's approximately 800,000 residents for the vote.
"On voting day, 30 August 1999, some 98 per cent of registered voters
went to the polls deciding by a margin of 94,388 (21.5 per cent) to
344,580 (78.5 per cent) to reject the proposed autonomy and begin a
'20 8
process of transition towards independence.
Pro-Indonesia militia forces opposing the outcome of the
referendum immediately initiated a violent campaign. 20 9 Jarat
Chopra, former head of the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) Office of District
Administration, compared the destruction to "the razing and salting
of ancient Carthage or the sacking of Troy. '210 In three weeks, the
Indonesian military, in concert with the allied militias, executed a
"scorched earth" policy which aimed to kill all Timorese over 15 years
old and destroy East Timor's infrastructure. 2 11 The murderous
campaign also displaced over 600,000 people, many of whom fled to
hills or "were forcibly removed in ships and trucks to West Timor or
neighboring islands. '212 Seventy percent of East Timor's "physical
'213
infrastructure was gutted.
2.

UNTAET's Mandate: Sweeping, but with Limits

The international community responded to the violence by
organizing "the Australian-led International Force in East Timor
(INTERFET). '214 INTERFET provided a temporary response to the
violence until the Security Council could establish a new mandate for

Timor's legal representative at the UN."). Portugal relinquished its legal claim and
pronounced UNTAET to be its successor. Chopra, supra note 202, at 29.
205.
S.C. Res. 1246,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1246 (June 11, 1999) ("Taking note of
the pressing need for reconciliation between the various competing factions within East
Timor." (underline omitted)).
206.
Id.
207.
See Ian Martin, The PopularConsultation and the United Nations Mission
in

East Timor-First Reflections,

in

OUT

OF

THE

ASHES:

DESTRUCTION

AND

RECONSTRUCTION OF EAST TIMOR 136, 140 (James J. Fox & Dionisio Babo Soares eds.,
2000) (noting that a total of 446,666 individuals registered).
208.
U.N. Mission of Support in East Timor, supranote 203.
209.
Barma, supra note.201.
210.
Chopra, supra note 202, at 27.
211.
Id.
212.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
Id. at 28.
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the reconstruction and administration of East Timor. The Security
Council followed up by unanimously passed Resolution 1272 under its
Chapter VII authority, 215 which established the U.N. Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).2 16
Resolution 1272
"endowed
[UNTAET]
with overall
responsibility
for the
administration of East Timor and . . .empowered [it] to exercise all
legislative and executive authority, including the administration of
justice. ' 217 It also authorized "UNTAET to take all necessary
measures to fulfill its mandate. '218 The burden of fulfilling this
expansive mandate 219 fell on the shoulders of the Transitional
Administrator. 220 The Secretary-General repeated the UNMIK model
by placing the Transitional Administrator in charge of all
22 1
administrative, security, and humanitarian operations.
Resolution 1272 appears at first blush to grant the Transitional
Administrator an unlimited amount of authority. UNTAET was
indeed "the formal government of East Timor" and it possessed a
222
single, individual, and final legislative and executive authority.
UNTAET marked the first time since the end of World War II that
223
the U.N. exercised full sovereignty over a territory.
Resolution
1272 may have
granted the Transitional
Administrator the final say on governance matters, but it certainly
was not a blank check.
The Security Council instructed the
Transitional Administrator to consult and cooperate with a number of
domestic and international agents. 224 It explicitly stressed "the need

215.
See U.N. Charter art. 42 ("[T]he Security Council ... may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.").
216.
S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. SJRES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
217.
Id.
1.
218.
Id. 7 4.
219.
See, e.g., Joao M. Saldanha & Marcelino X. Magno, Mission
Implementation: Developing Institutional Capacities, in U.N. INST. FOR TRAINING &
RESEARCH ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN EAST TIMOR
(UNTAET): DEBRIEFING AND LESSONS 161, 161 (Nassrine Azimi & Chang Li Lin eds.,
2003) (discussing and criticizing the mandate of UNTAET).
220.
See S.C. Res. 1272, supranote 216, 6 (stating that
The Security Council ... [wielcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to
appoint a Special Representative who, as the Transitional Administrator, will
be responsible for all aspects of the United Nations work in East Timor and will
have the power to enact new laws and regulations and to amend, suspend or
repeal existing ones.).
221.
See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Situation
in East Timor, 7 39-45, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1024 (October 4, 1999) [hereinafter Report
on Situation in East Timor].
222.
Chopra, supra note 202, at 29.
223.
Simon Chesterman, East Timor in Transition: Self-determination, Statebuilding and the United Nations, 9 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 45, 46 (2002).
224.
S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 216,
8-10.
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for UNTAET to consult and cooperate closely with the East Timorese
people" 225 and requested that UNTAET "cooperate closely" with both
the multinational peacekeeping force already deployed in East Timor
and "humanitarian and human rights organizations. '226 In addition,
Resolution 1272 reaffirmed "respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Indonesia. ' 22 7 The Secretary-General in a
separate report reiterated the need for UNTAET to be "in close
22 s
consultation and cooperation with the people of East Timor.
However, Security Council directives did not prohibit the Transitional
Administrator from vetoing the demands of the East Timorese
political representatives after consultation. 229 This implied power
would later become pivotal in relations between UNTAET and
domestic power holders.
3.

Not What They Bargained For: East Timorese Criticism of
UNTAET's "Authority Creep"

UNTAET assumed that the U.N.'s administrative and
humanitarian missions would have the support of the local
population. 230 The National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT)
was the lone Timorese "interlocutor with which to negotiate" 231 when
Sergio Vieira de Mello, the U.N. Transitional Administrator over East
Timor, arrived. 232 UNTAET initially enjoyed "conditions for success
that are rarely available to peace missions. ' 233 Donor countries had
committed "considerable funds" for East Timor's reconstruction, and
"UNTAET had the administrative authority to harmonise
international efforts[] and the legal authority to govern the
population and the territory . . . [as well as] popular sympathy and
political will. ' 234
In short, de Mello "arrived . . . to great
'235
expectations.
The Transitional Administrator wasted little time centralizing
authority.
A month earlier, the CNRT had-as part of the

225. Id. 8.
226. Id.
9-10.
227. Id. at 2. Contra Chesterman, supra note 223, at 46 (2002) (stating that the
word "sovereignty" does not appear in Resolution 1272).
228. Report on Situation in East Timor, supranote 221, 30.
229. See generally id. (lacking any prohibition on the vetoing of demands from
East Timorese political representatives).
230. See generally Martin, supra note 207, at 138-41 (discussing generally the
events surrounding the referendum vote on independence, including the security
situation and existence of a pro-integration militia, which received leadership from the
Indonesian Armed Forces).
231.
Chopra, supra note 202, at 27-28.
232. Id. at 29.
233. Id. at 28.
234. Id. at 29.
235. Id. at 32.
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negotiations over U.N. involvement-submitted a "modest" proposal
that reserved a limited role for the Timorese in the transitional
administration's decision-making apparatus. 23 6 However, the U.N.
Transitional Administrator ignored this proposal; immediately upon
his arrival, he "decided not to integrate Timorese into the transitional
structure, but rather to recruit locally a separate civil service. '237 The
Transitional Administrator's "fail[ure] to consult and involve the
people of East Timor in the decision-making process" made this
transitional administration unique relative to previous ones. 235 This
was despite the fact that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272
"stressed the need for UNTAET to consult and co-operate closely with
the East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate
'239
effectively.
The Transitional Administrator's actions were met with swift
criticism.
The CNRT publicly criticized UNTAET. 240
Xanana
Gusmao, East Timor's guerrilla leader and president of the CNRT,
became "increasingly disillusioned and dissatisfied with de Mello's
performance. '241 Criticism led de Mello to create the National
Consultative Council, which "provided the East Timorese with the
possibility to express their opinion[s] in the legislative process,
although the Transitional Administrator could ignore [their]
advice. ' 242
The National Consultative Council's authority was
considered illusory by most Timorese since de Mello retained de facto
243
veto authority over its recommendations.
By early 2000, UNTAET's legitimacy was already in question,
convincing de Mello to establish a Transitional Cabinet, in addition to
yet another "co-government" body, the East Timorese National

236.
237.
238.

Id.

Id.
Kondoch, supra note 4, at 250; see also Suzannah Linton, Rising from the
Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System in East Timor, 25 MELB. U. L.
REV. 122, 136 (2001) (noting difference between the U.N. transitional administration in
East Timor and those in Cambodia and Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western
Sirmium).
239.
Kondoch, supra note 4, at 250. Contra Galbraith, supra note 4, at 211
(according to Galbraith, UNTAET's transitional administrator, Sergio Veira de Mello,
"resisted proposals that experts write the [East Timor] constitution, deferring it to an
elected East Timorese constituent assembly. While Vieira de Mello retained absolute
authority, neither he nor the UN headquarters in New York ever overturned a decision
made by the transitional government.").
240.
See Ruth Wedgewood, Letter to the Editor, Trouble in Timor, FOREIGN
AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 197, 197-99 (discussing the UN's "course correction" after
public criticism by the CNRT, and the problems that still exist for East Timor in its
difficult road ahead).
241.
Chopra, supra note 202, at 32.
242.
Kondoch, supra note 4, at 250.
243.
See id. ("[T]he Transitional Administrator could ignore its advice."); see also
Chopra, supra note 202, at 32 ("Gustmo has become increasingly disillusioned and
dissatisfied with de Mello's performance.").
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Council (ETNC). 244 The U.N. Transitional Administrator did not
chair the ETNC, which consisted of only Timorese political
representatives. 24 5
Nevertheless, UNTAET retained ultimate
executive authority, which meant that the ETNC's and Transitional
246
Cabinet's new "authority" was more symbolic than substantive.
Gusmao expressed his sentiments and those of the Timorese cabinet
in the fall of 2000:
We are not interested in a legacy . . . of development plans for the
future designed by [people] other than East Timorese ....
We are not
interested in inheriting an economic rationale which leaves out the
social and political complexity of East Timorese reality. Nor do we wish
to inherit the heavy decision-making and project implementation
mechanisms in which the role of the East Timorese is to give their
consent as observers rather than the active players we should start to
be.

24 7

East Timorese cabinet members also threatened to resign in response
to UNTAET's failure to share decision-making authority. 248 They
publicly complained of being "used [by UNTAET] as a justification for
the delays and confusion in a process . . outside [of their] control.
The East Timorese Cabinet members are caricatures of ministers in a
government of a banana republic. They have no power, no duties, no
'249
resources to function adequately.
In summary, UNTAET went into East Timor with a sweeping
Security Council mandate. 250 The Transitional Administrator was
placed in charge of both the civil and security components of the
overall peacebuilding mission. 25 1 UNTAET exercised "full treatymaking powers," and the "World Bank's International Development
Association (IDA) was designated as the trustee of the reconstruction
Trust Fund for East Timor. '25 2 However, the formal Security Council
mandate also stressed the need for the Transitional Administrator to
cooperate and consult with the Timorese political leadership.
Instead, UNTAET quickly centralized power, presumably to expedite
the implementation of its policies without having to work through
consensus-building and collective action delays.
The Timorese
political leaders were "alarmed" at the U.N.'s policies since "they had
expected the U.N. to provide basic services, while they put their
-

244.
Kondoch, supra note 4, at 250.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
Chesterman, supra note 223, at 67.
248.
Mark Dodd, Give Us a Free Hand or We Quit, Leaders Say, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 5, 2000.
249.
Id.
250.
See S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 216, T 2 (resolution establishing the
mandate).
251.
Id.
252.
Chopra, supra note 202, at 29-30.
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political house in order. '253 In the end, it is difficult to accurately
assess UNTAET's legacy. Specifically, it is unclear how the U.N.'s
actions on the ground may alter the decision of future failing states to
invite future U.N. peacebuilding missions. One thing is certain: the
Timorese had expectations regarding the scope of U.N. action, based
on the Security Council's mandate and pre-intervention negotiations,
which were not met by UNTAET's actions on the ground.
C. United Nations TransitionalAdministrationin Kosovo and East
Timor: IncreasingAuthority, IncreasingFriction
U.N. transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor
wielded unprecedented legal and executive power and authority.
They enacted '[r]egulations' in areas such as economic law, taxation,
and court procedure" 254 and negotiated international treaties on
behalf of the territories they governed. 255 The manner and degree to
which transitional administrations felt compelled to exercise these
sweeping powers demonstrates the inherent difficulty in managing
the nexus between mandate ambiguity and the operational demands
of transitional governance. Simon Chesterman has observed that
"contradictions arise between the stated end of transitional
administrations-legitimate and sustainable national governanceand the available means-benevolent autocracy under the rule of the
'256
U.N. Security Council or some other international actor.
Autocracy is not necessitated by the mission mandates; it manifests
itself through a process described herein as "authority creep."
The Transitional Administrators in Kosovo and East Timor took
full advantage of the ambiguity in the mandates. The mandates'
ambiguity meant that the Administrators could have taken the
opposite course of action and shared domestic control with local
political actors. Such a strategy, though difficult both politically and
operationally, could have more effectively supported the U.N.'s
legitimacy among the population and provided greater incentives for
domestic actors to remain engaged and to comply with the
transitional authority. However, the Administrators instead tended
to centralize authority and to effectively limit the role of local political
leaders in the substantive decision-making process. One reason for
this approach was to speed the achievement of mission mandates and
cut through collective-action problems and disagreements with local

253.
Id. at 31.
254.
Matthias Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and East-Timor by the
InternationalCommunity, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 613, 622 (2001).
255.
See Linton, supra note 238, at 135 n.48 (providing examples of
international agreements UNTAET has entered into on behalf of East Timor).
256.
Chesterman, supra note 8, at 6.
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political actors;257 administrators face significant pressure, both
external and internal, to meet the terms of their mandate, provide
public goods, and show progress towards reconstruction and statebuilding. In some post-conflict environments, they must also balance
competing political factions within the host country in which they
operate-one solution to which is to simply centralize power during
the transitional administration.
The Administrators' reasons for following this course of action
are not of great importance to this Article. What is important is that
the tendency towards authority creep evidenced in these cases of
transitional administration may, over the long-term and across
multiple cases of intervention, generate a counterproductive pressure
against future U.N. attempts to intervene in and administer weak
and failed states.
Explicitly mandated international trusteeship over failing states
is unrealistic insofar as it directly violates the provisions of Article 78
of the U.N. Charter. However, trusteeship via "authority creep" is
quite likely. The cases of Kosovo and East Timor indicate the degree
to which the interplay between mandate ambiguity and operational
challenges may compel U.N. transitional governors to read their
Transitional
mandates expansively and govern accordingly.
authorities face extremely demanding conditions in weak and failing
Poor infrastructure, sclerotic or simply non-existent
states.
bureaucracies, and restive or counterproductive pressure from
political factions or leaders all exert severe pressure on international
missions facing clear demands to achieve significant results in
compressed timeframes. Such pressure leads to an understandable
tendency to centralize authority. This tendency carries near-term
operational benefits, but may ultimately have a corrosive influence on
U.N. legitimacy and the ability of the international community to
affect interventions in failing states.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

State weakening and failure poses a mounting danger to the
international system and to vulnerable populations across the globe.
While the level of human suffering resulting from institutional
weakness and collapse clearly calls for an urgent and concerted
response, the international community must also ensure that this
response is politically sustainable over the long term.
Trusteeship-whether de jure or de facto-may offer a viable
response to state failure, but it must be deployed with care, as its

Interviews with former UN officials (anonymous), Feb. 22, and Oct. 8, 2007
257.
(on file with authors).
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repeated application could undercut the international community's
ability to negotiate successive interventions-both weakly-with
political leaders in crumbling states. Specifically, repeated authority
creep may weaken the political basis among states for the temporary
governance of failing states under the banner of the U.N.
We believe that the U.N. must play a central role in the
management and reconstruction of failed states, for several reasons:
first, the organization carries unique legitimacy and a reputation for
impartiality, certainly unmatched by other actors; second, it has
amassed a great deal of technical expertise and capacity in
transitional administration and post-conflict reconstruction, by virtue
of its long and varied experience in peace operations; and third,
although it is certainly possible to imagine other arrangements
capable of supporting trusteeships in failed states, the U.N. already
provides an established and largely accepted legal and institutional
architecture on which to build such missions.
For the U.N. to play a successful role in the temporary
administration of weak and failing states, it must pay close attention
to the political dynamics within such societies, as well as the implicit
incentive systems created by international interventions. It must
also manage the risks inherent to authority creep with great care:
U.N. transitional administrations face enormous pressures to meet
difficult mandates in challenging environments, often under severe
resource constraints caused by donor governments' tendency to
support broad mandates with narrow (or uncertain) funding streams.
In the near-term, administrators' tendency to centralize power to
meet mission mandates may well speed decision-making and policy
implementation, and may or may not lead to more effective
governance and public goods provision.
But in the long-term,
untrammeled authority creep risks aggravating political actors in
host countries (thus risking non-compliance), and eroding political
support for trusteeship among both potential client and donor states
alike.
It is certainly the case that political actors in weak states pay
close attention to the dynamics of interventions elsewhere. This
attentiveness was recently displayed in Afghanistan, where the U.N.
has maintained a critical and high-profile assistance mission (the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA). The
U.N. proposed that Lord Paddy Ashdown, former
U.N. High
Commissioner in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), be its primary envoy
to Afghanistan and help reenergize its sagging mission there.
However, Ashdown's reputation preceded him: while serving in BiH,
Ashdown developed a highly centralized governing style, later noting
that the main issue confronting him and BiH's domestic political
representatives "was not whether to reform[,] [b]ut how fast, how

20081

THE "AUTHORITY CREEP' DILEMMA

soon and, above all, who will drive the process of reform-you or
me?" 258 Ashdown acknowledged that sharing political power with the
domestic political leaders would lead to delays in reform
implementation, 259 andhe pledged that he would "step in" and
"remove [political] obstacles" when the slowing of reforms from the
democratic process became too great.260 Ashdown's appointment,
consequently, was opposed and eventually rejected by Afghan
President Hamid Karzai who was concerned that Ashdown would
"come to Afghanistan with similar powers of bossing the government
26 1
round."
Weak and failed states are never political vacuums. Rather,
they are complex and highly conflictual environments in which
effective control is often fractured along multiple axes and among a
U.N. peace
range of actors competing for political authority.
operations, with few exceptions, have been founded upon the
substantive consent of domestic political leaders. Their consent (and,
in some cases, promises to disarm and demobilize forces) is often a
necessary prerequisite for the U.N. and donor states to commit the
political, financial, and organizational resources necessary to support
an effective intervention. 262 The donor governments that staff, fund,
and politically animate international interventions are rarely willing
to support extended multi-national, peace operations in any case.
The consent of domestic political leaders in failing and failed states
thus looms large: as Steven Ratner has noted, "durable strong
consent has been and should remain a sufficient touchstone for
member states' decisions to create new operations. '26 3 In return, the
U.N. is often in a position to offer domestic leaders at least nominal
local political participation when peacekeeping operations are
264
managed by a transitional governance arrangement.
In some cases the international community is able to employ
military or economic pressure in lieu of negotiating or cultivating the
consent of domestic political actors. 265 Such instances are rare. Most
often, the international community lacks the political will to level

258.
Knaus & Martin, Travails of the European Raj, 14 J. DEM. 60, 60 (2003).
259.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 61.
260.
261.
David Clarke, Ashdown Withdraws from Afghanistan Envoy Contest, Jan.
27, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.comlarticle/topNews/idUSL26294921200
80127.
262.
See Kondoch, supra note 4, at 245-46 (describing second generation
peacekeeping missions, which were based upon the consent of the parties).
STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN
263.
LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR 36 (1995).

264.
See id. at 246 (noting that since the Cold War, the U.N., following consent
of the parties, has provided administrators and peacekeeping forces to aid the parties
in the implementation of peace plans, which the parties had negotiated).
See, e.g., Ruffert, supra note 254, at 616.
265.
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credible threats,. and attempts to compel consent are brittle and
266
ineffectual.
The temporary multilateral governance of fragile states should
certainly not be abandoned. We believe that there are at least three
circumstances in which a full-scale, international administration is
both politically and operationally feasible as a means to govern,
reconstruct, and reconstitute weak and failed states, without the
risks identified above. In the event that a territory contains a true
vacuum of political authority, or the domestic political agents are
fragmented to the extent that collective action via U.N. -facilitated
power-sharing is impossible, overt trusteeship may indeed prove
effective and carry relatively few long-term risks.
The use of
transitional authority under such conditions is less likely to undercut
U.N. leverage and legitimacy in the eyes of domestic actors, political
leaders in other weak states, or other members of the international
community. If the international community deems local political
actors unsuitable for power-sharing-either because they are too
violent or untrustworthy, or because they have violated foundational
internal norms and covenants-trusteeship may be the best vehicle
for intervention, provided that political will exists among donor
governments to properly fund, staff, and support such a mission.
International trusteeship could also prove beneficial where local
actors have collectively consented to authoritative international
governance, in which case the absorption of significant (or even total)
sovereign authority by the U.N. may be justified by the degree of
security and public goods provided.
Such conditions will likely prove exceptional. In the main, weak
267
and failing states will remain well-populated by political agents
who are unlikely to willingly give up all of their stakes in a postconflict governing body or to face easy removal. It is much more
likely that the ability of the international community to pursue
transitional governance arrangements will depend upon its capacity
to credibly commit to some level of sovereignty-sharing with domestic
political actors.
The manner in which the international community interacts
with such actors has serious implications for the success of any single
U.N. mission, as well as for the future political foundations of
intervention. In the foregoing analysis, we have used two cases of de

266.
Since without such consent, the only way the UN can act is under Chapter
VII of the Charter. Id. For the Security Council to use this Chapter takes political will
and agreement. See U.N. Charter ch. VII.
267.
Complete political vacuums are rare, even in failed states. See, e.g.,
Abdulqawi Yusuf, Somalia's Warlords: Feeding on a Failed State, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,

Jan. 21, 2004, at 6, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/
2004/0121feeding.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
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facto trusteeship in weak states 268 as a vehicle to explore potential
points of friction that are likely to emerge as international
intervention moves beyond the assumption of partial domestic control
to the absorption of sovereign authority and substantive control. At
the time of intervention, Kosovo and East Timor were not vacuums of
political authority and, prior to U.N. intervention, neither had
achieved independence, let alone formal statehood. However, the
fundamental tension between international governance via authority
creep and expectations of local political leaders was apparent.
While the U.N.'s tenure in each case was limited, it should be
noted that actors in failing and failed states are understandably
sensitive to shifts in power that occur amidst peace processes or
transitions to new forms of governance. These transitional periods
present domestic political leaders with enormous opportunities to
shape new governance institutions and carve out the long-term basis
for political authority. U.N. missions that seize significant amounts
of authority thus risk shifting the calculus of domestic leaders that
are highly attuned to the exigencies of political competition. And
such leaders are often in a position to destabilize the already delicate
balance of politics, idealism, and power that facilitates peacekeeping
operations.
The importance of these incentives for domestic leaders in failed
states does not mean that the international community need
surrender effective control of intervention to the whims of local
leaders in order to secure access to the country. The international
community can bring inducements or threats to bear; it need not
compromise with domestic power holders on all issues or abandon the
U.N.'s foundational concerns with justice, equity, and human rights.
But the international community must, in considering trusteeship, be
mindful of the short- and long-term ramifications of effectively
sidelining local elites in the policymaking process.
Carefully
moderated transitional arrangements, which temper U.N. authority,
may ultimately prove effective in balancing near-term operational
demands with long-term political sustainability and trust amongst
potential future "clients" of trusteeship arrangements.
This problem has not gone unnoticed, either by the U.N. or
scholars, and the U.N. has evolved several mechanisms to improve
oversight and accountability. Transitional administrators remain
accountable to the Secretary-General and, through reporting
mechanisms, to the Security Council itself. 269
Such continual

268.
As we have indicated, these cases do not reach the threshold of mandate (de
jure) trusteeship, in which the Security Council in a resolution explicitly authorizes
U.N. governing authority independent of local actors. Instead, they constitute cases of
what we have referred to as "authority creep," in which U.N. administrators exercise
powers that effectively constitute trusteeship.
269.
CAPLAN, supra note 70, at 199.

102

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL.. 41..55

reporting on transitional administration activities serves to provide
some measure of transparency and accountability.
A second policy response to the problem of accountability-the
ombudsperson-has already been implemented in East Timor and
Bosnia with mixed success. 270 The ombudsperson "is an independent
public official who receives complaints from aggrieved individuals
against public bodies and government departments or their
employees and who has the power to investigate, recommend
corrective action, and issue reports. '271 The ombudsperson has, in
the international administrative context, sought "to promote and
protect the human rights and freedoms of individuals and legal
entities within the [territory governed by a transitional
administration]. ' 272 The overall jurisdiction and authority of the
ombudsperson
operating in conjunction
with international
273
transitional administrations, however, has thus far been limited.
In short, the ombudsperson's decisions are not controlling and-in the
case of Kosovo-have not always been honored by the governing
institutions against which complaints were filed. 274
The
ombudsperson thus may achieve the level of impartiality needed to
earn the trust of domestic actors but fail to achieve a necessary level
of legitimacy, since its decisions have no binding effect on the
transitional administration.
Scholars have also posed remedies to the problem of the political
accommodation of transitional administrations with domestic
political actors. In particular, Stephen Krasner's innovative solution,
sovereignty-sharing contracts between the international governing
authority and domestic political actors, offers some promise. In
Krasner's model, international authorities would craft an agreement
with domestic political actors, providing for shared administration
with no specified sunset date. 275 The advantages of this approach lie
in its long-term nature, which should dissuade spoilers eager to
hasten the exit of international forces, enhance cooperation between
locals and international authorities, 276 and promote the provision of
effective authority incentives to domestic political elites in weak and
failing states. 277
However, the approach faces several serious
problems. First and foremost, the notion of shared sovereignty would
stand little chance of acceptance by major powers such as China and

270.
See id. at 200-07 (discussing the function of an ombudsman and the use of
one in Kosovo and East Timor).
271.
Id. at 200. Caplan notes that this is consistent with the International Bar
Association's definition. Id. at 200 n.17.
272.
Id. at 201.
273.
Id. at 202.
274.
Id. at 203.
275.
Krasner, supra note 9, at 115-16.
276.
Id.
277.
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Russia that remain committed to a conventional reading of
sovereignty and almost certainly wary of "permanent" shared
governing arrangements. 2 78 Second, shared sovereignty would still
leave substantial ambiguity regarding the distribution of power
between domestic and international actors, and thus a contract
between a transitional administration and domestic political actors
would be based on nothing other than the good will of the parties.
Lastly, sharing sovereignty with a specified set of domestic actors
risks institutionalizing the balance of power amongst domestic groups
at the outset of the agreement, 279 potentially generating friction as
shifts in the distribution of power go unreflected by shared power
structures.
This Article recommends two alternatives. First, the donor
governments that fund and staff transitional administrations should
be prepared to commit greater resources for a longer duration.
Extended operations have a better chance of creating durable political
institutions than brief bursts of "benign dictatorship," and longerterm operations place less pressure upon transitional administrations
to generate near-term results, thus presenting fewer incentives to
maximize their authority within the constraints of the mandate.
There are many instances in which the added cost (in both time and
funding) of following this course of action will be outweighed by the
enhancement of the U.N.'s credibility, which will increase the
probability that leaders of other failing and failed states will also
invite and cooperate with U.N. intervention. In short, the U.N. would
have more opportunities to save more lives.
Second, this Article argues that the dilemma facing transitional
administrations can be avoided, or at least limited, by the
establishment of an arbitration body capable of handing down
decisions that bind transitional administrators. 280 As Perritt notes,
transitional administrators "make decisions that have winners and
losers. They must develop new legislation, grant and deny licenses to
valuable public privileges ...award contracts ...and restructure
industry."28 1 When local actors and institutions prove "dysfunctional"
in this decisionmaking process, the international administrators

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
278.
279.
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Democracy Building: Developing Democracy Through Transitional Governance in
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(2006).
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assume more sovereignty. 28 2
Our proposal would combine the
impartiality of the ombudsperson with the binding authority of the
Security Council in order to provide domestic political actors in weak
states with a transparent and enforceable mechanism to negotiate
conflicts and preserve political power.
The decisions of the
arbitration body would have to be public and transparent so as to
enhance the legitimacy of international administrations and provide
leaders and civil society in states subject to transitional
administration with some meaningful levers of political authorityand thus greater incentive to accede to intervention.
A distinct arbitration body could be created for each mission, or a
broader, standing arbitration commission could be created to serve
claims from all outstanding transitional administrations or peace
operations. In either case, the body would be charged with hearing
claims by both political- and civil-society organizations in the U.N.'s
"client" countries, thus offering both a piece of sovereign currency and
a measure of more direct accountability to both domestic leaders and
civil society.
Although transitional administrations would remain
answerable to the Secretary General, and required to continue to
report to the Security Council, the arbitration body could provide a
reasonably unbiased mechanism for the review (and if need be,
remedy) of both transitional authority policymaking and governance.
Relying on the Security Council to select the members of the
body would ensure that the Security Council powers would have an
opportunity to support candidates who most closely adhere to their
conceptions of sovereignty. This would have the effect of giving the
Security Council greater reason to pass resolutions for the
establishment of future transitional administrations.
This recommendation stands upon existing law and practice; the
U.N. Security Council already has the power to establish independent

282.
Id. at 5 (specifcally referring to the "international trsuteeship" established
for Bosnia). Perritt suggests establishing a "tribunal" that would resemble the
"ombudsman or a specialized court" while leaving "ultimate power to accept or reject
[the reviewing body's] deicions" in the hands of the head international administrator.
Id. at 73. The problem with this proposal is two-fold: first, judicial bodies performing
judicial review need some constitution, procedural statute, or other hard source of law
on which to base its decisions. In short, judges need clear rules. But if a transitional
administration's mandate is ambiguous in the first place, where will these rules come
from? The administrator can establish a separate administrative or procedural code
filling this gap, but the administrator might be encouraged to write rules that prevent
his or her ultimate authority challenged by the judicial body. Second, the decisions of
the body have to be binding on the transitional administration; otherwise, the purpose
of the judicial body is undermined. We believe an arbitration body has more flexibility
to import and apply already established procedural rules (such as those recommended
by the International Commission on Arbitration).
Finally, and critically, the
arbitration body's decisions must be binding on the transitional administrator.
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adjudicatory bodies, 28 3 which it exercised when it established the
International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia in 1993 and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1995.284 The
Security Council also submits a list of judge candidates nominated by
member states, from which the final judges are selected by the U.N.
General Assembly. 28 5 Article 29 of the U.N. Charter also provides
the Security Council with the power to "establish such subsidiary
'286
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.
The Security Council effectively delegates authority over
peacekeeping operations to the U.N. Secretary-General, who in turn
possesses the authority to "create bodies to make the decisions
necessary to carry out the tasks assigned to him. ' 28 7 In prior
transitional administrations, the Secretary-General has delegated
this
authority to transitional administrators.
Although
administrators may indeed have the power to bind their own hands
and submit to a self-created adjudicatory body, locating the body
beneath the Security Council would provide for greater perceived
independence, power, and visibility. With the advent of transitional
administrations and increasing calls for neo-trusteeship, the U.N. has
nearly come full-circle.
Unilateral nation-building efforts
notwithstanding, this Article anticipates that even a single, highimpact humanitarian or security meltdown in a failing or failed state
may generate serious consideration of international trusteeship as a
model for intervention. To be successful and sustainable, such
intervention must take place under the auspices of the United
Nations and must carefully balance operational and ethical demands
with the political needs of actors in weak and failing states. Ignoring
the hazards of authority creep risks undermining the long-term
legitimacy of international assistance in crumbling states.
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